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I. INTRODUCTION
Mass tort litigation is increasingly the preoccupation of judges and
others concerned with the operation of judicial systems. A mass tort is a
dispute involving multiple victims and usually, but not necessarily, multi-
ple defendants.' Such disputes are so large and complex that they raise
problems for courts that are uncommon in more traditional litigation be-
tween individuals or between private or public entities and individuals.
Examples include litigation over asbestos, diethylstylbesterol and other
drugs, fires and building collapses, and railroad and airline accidents.'
While such cases were not unknown in the past,3 there is an increasing
awareness today that large and complex litigation requires different pro-
cedures from other disputes. Among the noteworthy aspects of mass tort
litigation is the extent to which they have been settled by the parties
prior to trial.4 These settlements, moreover, are rarely achieved without
the intervention of a judge acting as case manager or mediator, or other-
wise facilitating fruitful communication between the parties. As a result,
judges, as well as litigators, have had to develop managerial and inter-
personal skills and create or develop new resources, many of which seem
far removed from traditional judicial decision-making.5 Negotiation
strategy and management of people and organizations are demanded of
1. Epstein, The Legal and Insurance Dynamics of Mass Tort Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 475, 476 (1984). Some writers prefer the term "complex case, or complex litiga-
tion," a more generic reference. See, e.g., Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex
Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 338 (1986); McGovern, To-
ward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex Litigation," 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 440
(1986). The term "mass tort" is a narrower referent to complex personal injury litigation.
See, e.g., Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986).
2. See, e.g., In re Bendectin Litigation, 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, Hoff-
man v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 788 (1989) (bendectin); Jenkins v.
Raymark Indus., supra note 1; and Rocco v. Johns-Manville Corp., 754 F.2d 110 (3d Cir.
1985) (asbestos); Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co. Inc., 747 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1984)
(Dalkon Shield); Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1977); and In
re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades on Dec. 29, 1972, 549 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir.
1977). Abel v. Eli Lilly and Co., 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164, cert. denied, E.R.
Squibb & Sons v. Abel, 469 U.S. 833 (1984) (DES);
3. See Epstein, supra note 1, at 477 for an account of some earlier mass torts.
4. See In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, Pinkney v. Dow Chemical Co., 1085 S. Ct. 695 (1988); In re Air Crash
Disaster at Stapleton International Airport, Denver, Colorado, on Nov. 15, 1987, 127
F.R.D. 197 (D. Colo. 1988); See also Coyle, A $105 Million Dupont Solution, NAT'L L.J.,
May 22, 1989, at 3; Bus Crash Cases Settled in Kentucky, NAT'L L.J., July 18, 1988, at 3;
Amtrak Reaches Settlement in 15 Crash Suits, NAT'L L.J., July 15, 1988, at 6; Desper-
ately Seeking Settlements, NAT'L L.J., June 20, 1988, at 1.
5. Lynch & Levine, The Settlement of Federal District Court Cases: A Judicial Per-
spective, 67 OR. L. REV. 239 (1988); Gabriel, Judicial Participation in Settlement. Pat-
tern, Practice, and Ethics, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON Dis. Res. 81 (1988); D. PROVINE, SETTLEMENT
STRATEGIES FOR FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES (1986).
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judges, who find themselves alternating between the roles of corporate
manager and psychological counselor as they struggle to make the sys-
tem accommodate the demands of these complex cases.'
Mass tort settlements are taking place in an atmosphere of ever-in-
creasing interest in alternative dispute resolution (ADR), a term gener-
ally used to describe new techniques for dispute resolution outside the
traditional judicial system.7 This groundswell of interest has focused new
attention on judicial settlement techniques. Going far beyond arbitration,
ADR encompasses techniques such as mediation, mock jury trials, expert
fact-finding, and the minitrial, all as a means of counteracting the per-
ceived negatives of litigation. These negatives are said to include high
cost, long delays, and alienation of litigants from the decision-making
process.8
While interest in ADR has grown, behavioral scientists and others
have sought to develop a theoretical basis for the analysis of negotiation
and dispute resolution. The result has been the emergence of an analyti-
cal framework for determining how and why certain conflicts are re-
solved through negotiation, or some other consensual method, and how
disputes can be managed so as to increase the likelihood of settlement.
This Article will apply certain theories derived from the behavioral liter-
ature to the successful mediation of a mass tort: the collapse of
L'Ambiance Plaza, a building under construction in Bridgeport, Con-
necticut, killing twenty-eight workers and injuring fourteen others. The
incident was the second largest construction accident in United States
history and the largest mass disaster ever in Connecticut.9 While there
have been many studies analyzing judicial settlement techniques, ° and a
6. See, e.g., Brazil, Hosting Settlement Conferences: Effectiveness in the Judicial Role,
3 OHIO ST. J. ON Dis. RES. 1 (1987); Provine, Managing Negotiated Justice: Settlement
Procedures in the Courts, 12 JUST. Sys. J. 91 (1987); Galanter, " . .A Settlement Judge,
not a Trial Judge:" Judicial Mediation in the United States, 12 J. L. & Soc'Y 1 (1985);
Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two Stage
Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253 (1985);
Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial tnd Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolu-
tion, 103 F.R.D. 461 (1984).
7. Alternative dispute resolution has received enormous attention in the legal literature
in recent years. For an overall sense of the field, see S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN, & F.
SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985); J. HENRY & J. LIEBERMAN, THE MANAGERS'
GUIDE To RESOLVING LEGAL DISPUTES (1985); see also supra notes 5 and 6.
8. See, e.g., D. PROVINE, supra note 5, at I nn.1-2; Katz, Enforcing An ADR Clause -
Are Good Intentions All You Have? 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 575, 580-81 (1988).
9. NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS, INVESTIGATION OF L'AMBIANCE PLAZA BUILD-
ING COLLAPSE IN BRIDGEPORT, CONNECTICUT (1987) [hereinafter NBS INVESTIGATION]
at 1; McGraw & Houston, '78 Tragedy Has Lessons for L'Ambiance Families, THE
HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 24, 1988, at 1.
10. Such studies generally fall into four categories. Some concentrate on describing and
categorizing alternative techniques (Provine, supra notes 5 and 6; Lynch & Levine, supra
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few focusing on mass torts,1 none have studied a particular dispute us-
ing the analytical framework derived from the behavioral sciences. This
Article seeks to fill that gap."
Litigation, predictably, began almost immediately after the
L'Ambiance Plaza collapse. What was not predictable was that within
nineteen months, two judges, one state and one federal, acting as a medi-
ation panel, would achieve a "global settlement," in which all claims
arising out of the collapse, including those of the forty-four plaintiffs,
over fifty contractors, several insurance and workers' compensation carri-
ers, and the United States Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion, were settled at the same time. The settlement was heralded as a
unique and highly successful example of judicial alternative dispute
resolution.13
By drawing on certain behavioral models, it will be possible to under-
stand what behaviors and what aspects of the dispute itself were critical
in bringing about such an early and extensive settlement. The result
note 5; Brazil, supra note 6). Others have developed quantitative data to measure such
variables as the length of case disposition (Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes:
What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious
and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983); Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer, &
Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 73 (1983)). A third cate-
gory consists of models designed to predict when settlement is economically efficient (R.
LEMPERT & J. SANDERS, AN INVITATION TO LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1986); Cooter,
Marks & Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic
Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982) [hereinafter Cooter]; Posner, The Summary Jury
Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observa-
tions, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366 (1986); Priest & Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litiga-
tion, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. &
ECON. 61 (1971); H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982); Raiffa,
Mediation of Conflicts, 27 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 195 (1983). Still others have questioned
whether the enthusiasm for ADR in the courts is grounded in reality and/or meets the
requirements of justice as defined in American law (Schuck, supra note 1; Posner, supra
note 10; Gabriel, supra note 5; Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984)). Most
works on alternative dispute resolution include some evaluation of the process, as will this
article in the concluding sections.
11. Schuck, supra note 1; P. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL (1986); McGovern,
supra note 1; and Epstein, supra note 1.
12. Seminal work in this area has been done by Carrie Menkel-Meadow, who has writ-
ten extensively on the relationship of the behavioral literature on dispute resolution and
legal negotiation. See Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984); Menkel-Meadow, Legal
Negotiation: A Study of Strategies in Search of a Theory, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. R. J. 905
(1983). Menkel-Meadow does not, however, apply her theoretical work in the case study
format.
13. Judge, Lead Counsel Analyze Building Collapse Mediation, 3 BNA ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION REPORT 92 (March 16, 1989) (summarizing a symposium on the
L'Ambiance Plaza Mediation held at Princeton University by the New Jersey Center for
Dispute Resolution); The CPR "88 ADR Awards: Wide Spectrum of Winners, 7 ALTERNA-
TIVES 37, 42 (March, 1989).
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should provide new understanding of mass tort settlements. It should also
prove useful to judges and litigators as they strive to adjust to the new
demands made by settlement techniques, to deploy their personal and
institutional resources more effectively, and to remain faithful to the un-
derlying values of justice and fairness that the judicial system strives to
serve.
The two L'Ambiance Plaza judges succeeded as mediators because
they employed many of the techniques that behavioral scientists have
determined are critical to a negotiated resolution of complex disputes.
Specifically, the mediators were able to alter the parties' perceptions of
the case, and of the potential results of full scale litigation, in order to
make settlement appear the more attractive alternative. They were able
to expand the disputed issues in order to create attractive opportunities
for compromise and trade-offs. By incorporating all aspects of the litiga-
tion into the "global" settlement, the panel was able to expand the op-
portunities for linking issues and trading gains and losses, and to bring
about an integrated settlement in which all parties could attain at least
some of their main goals. Finally, the mediators instituted a process in
which all participants had great trust and which, in many ways, dupli-
cated for the parties the sense of justice and due process that is usually
associated with traditional litigation. Some of the mediators' methods,
however, led parties to participate in the mediation and settlement who
had no actual or potential liability, raising serious questions about the
ultimate fairness of the process.
For many reasons, L'Ambiance Plaza is a useful case to study. For
one thing, it took place at a key point in the evolution of judicial ADR.
After an initial period of experimentation, techniques such as mock jury
trials, expert fact-finding and formal mediation through special masters
or specially appointed judges became commonplace in many federal
courts. 14 The federal district court in New Haven had used such tech-
niques before the L'Ambiance Plaza collapse. In fact, Judge Robert C.
Zampano, the mediator who is credited with bringing about the settle-
ment, 15 was instrumental in bringing innovative settlement techniques to
New Haven. For two years before L'Ambiance he had been designated
special "settlement judge" and had devoted all his time to developing
14. D. PROVINE, supra note 5; Brazil, supra note 6.
15. Much information on the mediation in this article is derived from interviews with
participants and with Judge Zampano. Without exception, the participants refer to Judge
Zampano as the leader of the panel. Judge Frank S. Meadow, however, the Connecticut
Superior Court Judge who served with Judge Zampano as the L'Ambiance Plaza Media-
tion Panel, contributed a great deal to the outcome of the mediation and served as crucial
liaison to the state court system.
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ADR methods in cases referred to him by other judges in the district."6
It is an opportune time, therefore, to evaluate these techniques analyti-
cally before they become entrenched in the courts. In addition,
L'Ambiance is heuristically useful because of its size. It was small for a
mass tort. Any air crash or hotel fire is likely to have many times the
number, zf victims. But precisely because of its size, L'Ambiance allows
us to view with relative ease the total environment of the dispute and to
isolate factors that in larger cases might remain obscure.
Part one of this Article begins with a brief description of the accident
and of the ultimate settlement. This is followed by an overview of the
behavioral theories of negotiation and dispute resolution that will be em-
ployed to analyze the settlement process. Thereafter the Article analyzes
the mediation process in detail, applying those theories to the events
from the time of the collapse to the final settlement hearing. It concludes
with a detailed evaluation of those factors that were key to the successful
mediation effort and suggests a need to guard against the threat in any
ADR method of overriding the demands of justice and the overall goals
of the justice system to achieve the short term interests of the parties.
II. THE COLLAPSE
L'Ambiance Plaza was planned as a nine story moderate income hous-
ing facility consisting of two towers separated by a central courtyard.
Bridgeport had been suffering from poor economic conditions for several
years, and L'Ambiance was conceived of by some as the centerpiece of a
new economic renaissance, encouraging investment in downtown real es-
tate development that could lure some of the more glamorous corporate
and financial tenants away from New Haven, Stamford and the interven-
ing suburbs.17 On April 23, 1987, without warning, the partially com-
pleted structure collapsed inward in less than ten seconds.' 8 The precise
cause of the collapse is still unclear. The United States Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) attributed it to defects in
the unusual construction method used. L'Ambiance Plaza was built us-
ing the lift slab construction technique. This means that concrete floor
16. Zampano, Senior Judge as Settlement Judge in the District of Connecticut, at 4-5
(1986) (unpublished manuscript); Zampano, Settlement Conferences With Experts (1986)
(unpublished manuscript); D. PROVINE, supra note 5, at 79-80. See also Zampano, The
Mini-Trial in Federal Court: A Judge's View, in CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES, CORPO-
RATE DISPUTE MANAGEMENT M-H 59 (1982).
17. Judge, Lead Counsel Analyze Building Collapse Mediation, supra note 13, at 92;
interview with Edward Hennessey, attorney for the City of Bridgeport, in Hartford, Con-
necticut (June 19, 1989).
18. NBS INVESTIGATION, supra note 9, at 27-28.
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slabs were poured on the ground and then lifted, several at a time, by a
hydraulic jack to the point where they could be attached to the steel
columns framing the building. As each slab reached its correct position,
it was attached, either temporarily or permanently, by a collar, or
shearhead, which was welded to the slab and then attached to the
columns.
OSHA concluded that the most probable cause of the collapse was the
failure of the lifting system in the west tower, specifically the failure of a
lifting angle at one of the shearheads as it was attached to the column. 19
Others argued that a faulty engineering design, most probably having to
do with the placement of tension wires stretched across each slab and
cemented into the concrete, created an inherent weakness in the slabs.
Still others claimed that excessive water in the soil beneath the building
caused the concrete footings to shift downward, putting too much stress
on the steel columns and causing the collapse. Another set of theories
focused on the weakness in the concrete used to pour the slabs and to
weld them to the shearheads.2 ° The actual number of deaths could be
attributed, in part, to the fact that workers were allowed to continue
working under the slabs as they were lifted into place, in violation of
OSHA regulations.21 Had the site been cleared the number killed would
have been far less.22 The mediation panel concluded that there were mul-
tiple causes, and "widespread negligence, carelessness, sloppy practices,
19. Id. at v, 209. OSHA adopted the conclusions of the NBS Report. Its subsequent
citations were based on violation of the general duty clause, 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1982) and
general regulations on safety instruction, 29 C.F.R. § 1926.21(b)(2) (1989) and on lift
slab, 29 C.F.R. § 1926.305(b) (1989). The latter requires that hydraulic jacks used in lift
slab "have a-safety device which will cause the jacks to support the load in any position in
the event the jack malfunctions," and to install a control device "which will stop the opera-
tion when the inch leveling tolerance is exceeded." 29 C.F.R. § 1926.305(b)(1),(2)
(1989).
20. Information on alternative theories of causation was derived from interviews with
several persons, including Kevin Coles, attorney for Texstar, Inc., in Bridgeport, Connecti-
cut (Dec. 16, 1988); Joseph Egan, Business Agent, Local Union 424, International Associ-
ation of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, in New Haven, Connecticut
(Nov. 10, 1988); Garrett Moore, attorney for plaintiffs, in New Haven, Connecticut (Oct.
12, 1988).
21. It takes several hours to lift a set of slabs into place. As a result, contractors like to
keep other work in progress during the lifting. In commenting on proposed new OSHA lift
slab regulations, Texstar stated that ". . .the economics of not allowing workers in the
building during lifting would eliminate lift slab as a viable competitive system." 54 Fed.
Reg. 16,132 (April 21, 1989).
22. Ironically, many construction workers considered lift slab a relatively safe process.
Most deaths in the industry result from falls, and on a lift slab job fewer workers have to
spend long hours high up on a scaffolding. Interview with Joseph Egan, supra note 20.
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and complacency on the part of over twenty entities connected directly or
indirectly to the construction of the L'Ambiance Plaza building."2
The existence of so many theories of causation was a result of the
large number of contractors involved in the project, and the need of each
to shift the blame to the others. At the same time, as we shall see,
spreading the blame over many entities eventually enabled the mediation
panel to enlarge the linkages in the dispute and gather enough money to
bring about the mediated settlement. Nineteen months after the collapse,
on December 1, 1988, in New Haven, Connecticut, five different
courts, 24 sitting simultaneously, approved a $41 million settlement of all
claims arising out of the collapse. Over seventy potential defendants25
contributed to or participated in the settlement. The successful mediation
was credited with avoiding up to ten years of litigation and appeals.
III. THEORIES OF NEGOTIATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The analysis of disputes has its genesis in the emergence of game the-
ory, a discipline developed after World War II and applied mainly in the
field of international relations.2 6 In game theory some conflicts are de-
scribed as zero-sum games, meaning that there is a finite resource to be
divided, and any gain for one party (the winner) is accompanied by a
commensurate loss to the other (the loser) .27 Litigation is in many ways
a zero-sum game, in which there are absolute winners and losers.28 One
party gains something, usually money, and the other loses, or pays. The
payment and the gain sum to zero. Even nonmonetary disputes are
23. Interim Report, L'Ambiance Plaza Mediation Panel 4-5 (Nov. 15, 1988) [hereinaf-
ter Interim Report].
24. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, the Superior Court
of the State of Connecticut, Judicial District of Waterbury, the Connecticut State Probate
Court, the Connecticut Workers' Compensation Commission, and the United States Occu-
pational Safety and Health Review Commission.
25. Throughout the text, the term "defendant" will be used to refer to all the commer-
cial entities involved in the mediation and settlement; the City of Bridgeport; the Connecti-
cut Housing Finance Authority; and OSHA, although, as we shall see, only four of these
were ever sued by the plaintiffs. The term "plaintiff" will be used to refer to all the victims
of the collapse and all the personal representatives of those who were killed.
26. See, e.g., R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS (1957); H. RAIFFA, supra
note 10; T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960); J. VON NEUMANN & 0.
MORGANSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1944); I. ZARTMAN, THE
FIFTY-PERCENT SOLUTION (1976).
27. T. SCHELLING, supra note 26, at 82-84; L. SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING
THE IMPASSE 85 (1987). J. VON NEUMANN & 0. MORGENSTERN, supra note 26, at 84-85.
28. Menkel-Meadow takes this view. Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal
Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, supra note 12, at 756; Legal Negotiation:
A Study of Strategies in Search of a Theory, supra note 12, at 911. Other writers conceive
of litigation somewhat differently.
[Vol. 5:2 1990]
THE L'AMBIANCE PLAZA MEDIATION
viewed this way. In a patent case, for example, the resource to be divided
is the exclusive right to an idea. If one party wins that right, the other
loses it. Zero-sum games, with their winner-take-all outcomes, are risky,
uncertain, and expensive.
In a true zero-sum game, a negotiated agreement is difficult. One side
is unlikely to agree to give up everything for the benefit of the other.
Zero-sum games, therefore, including lawsuits, tend to result in solutions
imposed by third parties such as judges. (Some such games are settled
by other means, such as war or armed combat, but these are beyond the
scope of this Article.) The fact that most lawsuits are settled out of court
does not detract from their zero-sum nature. Solutions may be "im-
posed" in such cases because the law, either through precedent or legis-
lation, dictates a certain result and the parties deem it useless to con-
tinue.29 For other reasons, the parties might decide that some linear
division of the resource at stake is preferable to continued litigation. The
result is still usually a transfer of value from one to another, with a net
result of zero.
It is possible, however, to view lawsuits as nonzero-sum games.3" A
nonzero-sum game is one in which there are outcomes that involve gains
and losses for both sides.31 There are some outcomes that at least one
party prefers that do not involve disadvantages for the other party. 2 Par-
ties may have different interests which can be mutually accommodated.
While neither one might gain everything, neither will lose everything.
The process of reaching a nonzero-sum solution is sometimes referred to
as integrative bargaining, in which the different interests of the parties
are integrated into an agreement with joint gains and shared losses.33 In
contrast, zero-sum games involve distributive bargaining: the subject of
the dispute is distributed among the adversaries. Nonzero-sum, integra-
tive solutions are usually, though not always, preferable to a winner-
take-all outcome, because they offer the opportunity for solutions that
would not be possible in a zero-sum game.
Pending lawsuits are nonzero-sum games to the extent that they in-
clude opportunities for settlement that involve mutual gain. In a dispute
over money, for example, time becomes a factor that can lead the parties
from distributive to integrative bargaining. The plaintiff may prefer a
low payment today to a higher payment after a trial three years from
29. Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation, supra note 12, at
789.
30. Cooter, supra note 10; R. LEMPERT & J. SANDERS, supra note 10, at 140 n.3.
31. Id. See also L SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, supra note 27, at 85-86.
32. Id.
33. H. RAIFFA, supra note 10, at 131; L. SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, supra note 27, at
85-87.
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now. The parties can integrate the plaintiff's interest in an immediate
response to the defendant's interest in a low payout. Time, as we shall
see, became a major factor in the L'Ambiance settlement. More complex
cases offer even more opportunities for nonzero-sum solutions. To return
to the example of a patent dispute, an arrangement for limited use of a
patented process, with payment of royalties and some control by the
original patent holder over future use, might be preferable to a litigated
outcome in which the right to the patent is given exclusively to one party
or denied entirely.
Two points are apparent from the foregoing analysis. One is that in-
tegrative solutions are, for the most part, beyond the powers of courts to
impose. Litigated solutions are zero-sum solutions.3 4 This leads to the
second point: lawsuits are resolved through negotiated settlements be-
cause the parties perceive the possibility of an integrative resolution, and
they perceive that such a resolution is preferable to its alternatives.
Disputes, including lawsuits, can be changed from zero-sum to
nonzero-sum games, and the parties moved from distributive to integra-
tive bargaining, when the parties' perceptions are changed so that they
see opportunities for mutually satisfactory solutions.35 This requires a
search for linkages 6 or items to trade.37 Theorists who seek to encourage
such solutions frequently refer to the need to approach such disputes as
problems to be solved jointly, by side-by-side "cooperative antagonists,"
rather than by adversaries across a bargaining table.38
Generating linkages or trades means discovering joint interests of the
parties which might not be apparent at the beginning of a dispute. It
may also mean altering the environment of the dispute to increase the
number of possible outcomes. For example, in addition to time, transac-
tion costs are a factor in virtually every lawsuit. One of the parties, or a
34. There are exceptions to this statement, but they are rare. The Connecticut legisla-
ture, for example, recently enacted a preference for periodic payments of noneconomic
damages over $200,000 in personal injury actions, but then amended its statute a year later
to return to lump sum payments absent the parties' agreement. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
52-225(d)(b) (West Supp. 1989), amending § 52-225(d)(c) (1987). Judges in domestic
disputes often have discretion to impose creative resolutions as to custody and even prop-
erty distribution. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-80 (West 1986) and § 46b-56 (West
1986). Nevertheless, such examples are overshadowed by the overwhelmingly winner-take-
all nature of litigation.
35. J. SUSSKIND & L. CRUIKSHANK, supra note 27, at 33, 78-79; Cooter, supra note 10,
at 242; 1. ZARTMAN & M. BERMAN, THE PRACTICAL NEGOTIATOR 13 (1982).
36. H. RAIFFA, supra note 10.
37. For an excellent popular description of this process, see R. FISHER & W. URY, GET-
TING To YES ch. 4 (1981). See also L. SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, supra note 27, at 86.
38. R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 37; H. RAIFFA, supra note 10, at 18. See also
Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation. The Structure of Problem
Solving, supra note 12, at 758.
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third party, may take steps to increase or decrease these costs, in order
to highlight cost savings as another area of joint interest that can be
exploited to reach a solution. Noticing lengthy depositions is one exam-
ple of such behavior. Like time, the costs of litigation were a major fac-
tor in the L'Ambiance Plaza mediation, and one which was used exten-
sively by the mediators to encourage settlement.
In another aspect of dispute resolution analysis, several theorists have
created models of bargaining behavior to describe the negotiation pro-
cess. 39 Such models, like other social science models, are based on the
assumption that actors in disputes behave rationally, and therefore we
should be able to predict how they will behave once certain variables are
specified. Models are useful in viewing both zero-sum and nonzero-sum
situations. Typically these consist of a linear representation of the vari-
ables that will or will not lead to settlement. One party, a seller, for
example, multiplies its target, or hoped-for sales price by its estimate of
its probability of ultimate success in getting that price. The seller then
subtracts the expected costs of losing the sale, and the result is the
amount at which the seller should be willing to sell. This figure is some-
times termed the reservation price (RP) meaning the point below which
no agreement is preferable to agreement.40 To arrive at the buyer's RP,
one performs a similar computation. If the results overlap, the dispute
should settle, and the settlement should fall within the range of the two
numbers.4 1
This model mirrors to some degree what most negotiators do intui-
tively, with far less precision. Negotiators usually have in mind some
outcome, either in dollars or other factors, that they consider a mini-
mally acceptable outcome, or RP. The RP should be based on the
probability of expected gain or loss and expected costs. This is the bot-
tom line, the least amount one will settle for. While not all disputants
39. Posner, supra note 10; Priest & Klein, supra note 10; Landes, supra note 10; H.
RAIFFA, supra note 10; R. LEMPERT & J. SANDERS, supra note 27, at ch. 6.
40. H. RAIFFA, supra note 10, at 37.
41. H. RAIFFA, supra note 10, at 57-65. At its simplest level, such a representation looks
like this, if s is the Seller and b is the Buyer:
RP Range for s
50 100 150 200
Range for b RP
Id.at 57. Decision tree analysis is another method often used in analyzing disputes from the
perspective of the decision makers. Decision trees attempt to quantify the risks at any given
point in the negotiations. Id. at 74-76.
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consciously articulate an RP, even to themselves, its existence is a given
if one is to assume rational negotiating behavior. The extent to which the
parties' reservation prices overlap determines whether a negotiated solu-
tion is possible and at what amounts. If my top price is twenty dollars
and your bottom line is fifteen dollars, we should be able to agree on
some price between those numbers, even if you begin by asking thirty-
five dollars and I insist on ten dollars. Integrative bargaining in this
model consists of determining the true RPs of the participants.
Closely linked to the reservation price (RP) is the notion of a
BATNA, or Best Alternative to a Negotiated Settlement.42 It refers to
the projected outcome should negotiations fail to generate a settlement.
In a lawsuit, a BATNA is full scale litigation, with its attendant costs
and risks. Presumably, and again assuming rational actors, one's reserva-
tion price will depend on one's BATNA. A reservation price should not
be worse than a BATNA. Moreover any lower outcome is not an effi-
cient solution, and arguably not a fair or just outcome either, assuming
that an outcome worse than the law would impose is not just.
In litigation, the RP can be arrived at mathematically by taking the
amount at stake and multiplying that by the probability of success at
trial, and then adding or subtracting future transaction costs. By per-
forming this calculation for both sides, one can determine whether settle-
ment is possible. Again, experienced litigators behave this way intui-
tively. If the plaintiff's RP, or minimum demand, is less than the
defendant's RP, or maximum offer, the case will settle, presuming the
plaintiff's RP is based on the estimated outcome times the probability of
success at trial, less the costs of trial plus the costs of settlement. Con-
versely, the defendant's maximum is based on the probability of plain-
tiff's success times the probable amount of loss after trial, plus the costs
of trial less the costs of settlement.43
This model presents problems when one wants to describe integrative
bargaining, in which a number of variables can be combined so that
many potential solutions are possible. In such a dispute, the RP would
have to represent the one integrated solution out of many that would be
42. R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 37, at 104.
43. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 522-28 (3d ed. 1986). Posner's formula
for estimating settlement is:
Ppi- C + S < Pdj + C- S
or, (Pp - Pd)J < 2(C - S)
If "J is the size of the judgment if plaintiff wins P is the probability of the plaintiff's
winning as estimated by the plaintiff, and Pd is the defendant's estimate of that probability.
C and S are the costs to each party of litigation and of settlement, respectively." Id. at 524.
See also Landes, supra note 10, at 101-06. But see Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for
Trial Biased? 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 185 (1985).
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minimally acceptable to the parties. Other combinations of variables
would not be represented. Moreover, a linear equation cannot account
for the analytical process that led to the conclusion that a single combi-
nation of variables was the RP.44 Instead, more elaborate models are
needed, which can graph or otherwise represent a range of solutions,
many of which might be mutually acceptable outcomes.
Labor negotiations provide a helpful example of this need for more
elaborate models. Imagine that the parties are bargaining over annual
wage increases, medical benefits and a day care center. Different per-
centage wage increments can be combined with different medical benefit
plans and the day care center to yield a large number of possible combi-
nations. The parties could each place a numerical value on each combi-
nation of solutions and then create a graph to represent visually all possi-
ble outcomes. These outcomes are sometimes termed a negotiation set.
45
The graph would delineate those outcomes that should be acceptable to
both parties. In this way such a model would yield a series of best, or
most efficient, solutions by mathematically determining solutions in
which one party gains and the other, at the least, does not lose. Such
solutions are sometimes referred to as a Pareto optimal set, or the effi-
cient frontier.4 6 The efficient frontier can be mathematically determined,
based on the values placed by the parties on the multiple issues and
44. Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation, supra note 12, at
793-94.
45. H. RAIFFA, supra note 10, at 133-42.
46. R. LEMPERT & J. SANDERS, supra note 10, at 144-45.
B
-0
F
E (2500)
-3000 G
-5000 D C
0 2000 5000
Plaintiff's utility
Figure 6.3
"The line connecting points F and G constitute what is called a Pareto optimal set. All
points along this line are optimal in the sense that once one point on this line is chosen,
there is no other outcome that is better for both parties. Furthermore, points off this line
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items in dispute."7 The value of such models for dispute resolution is that
they can be used by the participants or by third parties such as
mediators to determine whether and on what terms settlement ought to
occur.
48
Models are also useful in clarifying the dynamics of negotiations by
showing how a change in one factor in a dispute affects the likelihood of
settlement. Modeling demonstrates not only the relationships among the
factors in dispute; it shows the impact of a change in one or more factors
on the eventual outcome.4 9 Anything that alters a party's RP changes
the chances for overlap, or agreement. Similarly, expanding the number
of issues to be resolved or valuing the combinations of issues differently
affects the efficient frontier. Conversely, removing some items from the
table lessens the chances of settlement.
IV. THE ROLE OF THIRD PARTIES
The models just described carry major implications for the role of third
parties in legal dispute resolution. They add an entirely new dimension to
traditional notions of the role of mediators or other third party dispute
resolvers by demonstrating that mediators are most effective when they
do three things: (1) determine the parties' interests and the way the par-
ties value different options; (2) create more accurate estimates of the
factors that determine settlement; and (3) generate new options by ex-
ploring interests not originally apparent and, sometimes, by creating new
linkages that can be factored into the settlement equation. For example,
a mediator can learn from the parties what their true interests are and
what interests have priority over others. In traditional litigation, or in
other disputes, the parties rarely reveal to each other accurate informa-
tion about their RPs. Mediators can also change a party's RP by provid-
ing an objective and reliable estimate of the merits of the claims, or by
educating the parties about how juries have decided comparable cases in
the recent past. Morever, mediators might suggest options and linkages
not previously identified by the parties, and then analyze possible out-
but in the negotiation set may leave both parties worse off than they would be if they
settled at some point on this line." Id. See also H. RAIFFA, supra note 10, at 99-103, 139.
47. H. RAIFFA, supra note 10, at 158-64, 177.
48. Id. at 236-45. Raiffa and others cited here have developed highly sophisticated quan-
titative models of negotiation behavior that are beyond the scope of this Article. Interested
readers are urged to pursue these materials to experience the complexity and richness in
options available for the application of behavioral research to legal disputes.
49. For an excellent discussion of the use of modeling by third parties, see Id. at chs. 15
& 16; L. SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, supra note 30, at 163, 179-80; Raiffa, supra note
10.
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comes involving such new items. Mediators can thus enlarge the parame-
ters of the dispute by expanding the issues in dispute.50 They can do all
this at an early stage, before the parties have invested too much in a
litigated solution. In other words, mediators, or other third parties, can
change the factors in the equations used for modeling disputes, and in so
doing, increase the chance of settlement.
Judges are especially effective at applying these methods of mediation.
A judge's opinion on the expected value of a case is respected because it
represents the solutions that other judges are likely to impose without a
negotiated settlement. 5' Through the prestige of office and the resources
available to them, judges can use tools such as mock jury trials or expert
advisory panels to bring about similar revisions in perception. 52 In addi-
tion, by ruling on motions or controlling the calendar, they alter the ac-
tual items in the settlement equation. A motion ruling may change radi-
cally the probabilities used by the parties to arrive at their RPs. A
change in trial schedule will alter the value of time as a factor in settle-
ment.53 The mediators in L'Ambiance Plaza exhibited many of these be-
haviors in molding the parties' settlement decisions.
Of course, analysis of a dispute should not ignore the traditional func-
tions of a mediator. These include:
1. Creating effective procedures for joint problem solving. Mediators
often focus on process, including determining times and places for meet-
ings and ground rules for discussions.
2. Initiating negotiations. Sometimes the parties are reluctant to make
the first move towards negotiations for fear of appearing weak or uncer-
tain of the strength of their case. A mediator can perform an important
service just by opening communications.
3. Creating trust and empathy. One of the most important roles of a
mediator is to create a situation in which the parties can reveal their true
interests in a setting of trust. Mediators must work to build trust in
themselves as mediators, trust in the mediation process, and, finally,
trust between the parties.5 ' Creating a forum in which the parties can
honestly reveal their goals and priorities is very important. Some dis-
putes settle as soon as each side has the chance to tell the mediator, a
sympathetic listener, their story of what happened. Successful mediators
50. Lynch & Levine, supra note 5. See also authorities cited supra note 48.
51. Lynch & Levine, supra note 5; Brazil, supra note 6, at 35.
52. Posner, supra note 10,.at 371; D. PROVINE, supra note 5, at 68; Lambros, supra note
6, at 466.
53. Schuck, supra note 1, at 358.
54. See, e.g., Colosi, Negotiation in the Public and Private Sectors, 27 AM. BEHAV. Sci.
229, 242-43 (1983).
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
say that sometimes people just need someone to talk to, or cry with
them, to make them responsive to a negotiated agreement. 55
4. Proposing solutions. Activist mediators, including judges, see their
role as studying the case in order to propose solutions which create op-
portunities for joint gains. As we have seen, this role is best understood
in an analytical framework in which solutions are valued and then com-
pared as to relative value.
5. Maintaining fairness. A mediator cannot be effective without taking
responsibility for the fairness and integrity of the process. This role re-
quires a delicate balance. The mediator must remain objective, and not
inject his or her own values into the settlement; nevertheless the media-
tor must guard against solutions that are unfair to one or more parties.
The mediator is also responsible for redressing any power imbalances
that exist among the parties. The procedures must also be kept fair, with
neither party given greater access to information than the others, and
finally, the mediator must resist the temptation to pressure the parties
into a settlement just to see the process succeed. To some degree, the
mediator is also responsible to the system in which the dispute takes
place, and to the larger social system as well, to see that the process and
agreement do not offend any basic societal or systemic values. Judges as
mediators have certain advantages in fulfilling all these functions. They
can make the resources of the judicial system available to the parties.
They can propose negotiations and they have the prestige to bring even
the most reluctant parties to the bargaining table.56
In L'Ambiance Plaza, judges acted as mediators and effectively ad-
dressed all these traditional functions. In addition, they influenced be-
havior by altering parties' perceptions and enlarging the items in the dis-
pute. The latter factors were critical to the eventual success of the
mediation.
V. THE COLLAPSE AND EARLY LITIGATION
Judicial mediation of the L'Ambiance Plaza litigation began in Janu-
ary, 1988. Up to that point, the litigation had gone through two phases,
the first involving a Bill of Discovery to determine whom to sue, and the
second the filing of tort suits against three key defendants. Immediately
after the collapse, the plaintiffs filed a Complaint in the nature of a Bill
55. See Pilot Insurance ADR Project Results in Many Settlements, 7 ALTERNATIVES
(CPR) No. 3 at 37, 40 (March, 1989).
56. Raiffa calls judges "mediators with clout," meaning that because of the power of the
office, parties are reluctant to appear uncooperative or unreasonable. Raiffa, supra note 10;
see also Schuck, supra note 1, at 357-58.
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of Discovery against eleven defendants, including the property owner, the
general contractor on the site, and the City of Bridgeport. This is an
equitable discovery device, rarely used today, that dates back to the be-
ginnings of English common law. Originally it was used to obtain the
testimony of adverse parties when such testimony was not admissible at
trial, and to compel production of physical evidence before the advent of
the subpoena duces tecum.57 More recently it has been used to gain in-
formation needed for an action pending or about to be brought, when the
plaintiff can show no adequate remedy at law, that is, no means of ob-
taining the information through traditional discovery devices.5
The plaintiffs' ostensible reason for bringing the Bill of Discovery was
consistent with its earliest uses. They had to identify all the contractors
and entities involved with the project to find out whom to sue.59 They
also wanted a quick way to obtain an attachment on the property, and
they wanted to preserve potential evidence from destruction during the
clean-up process. In general, the Bill of Discovery functioned to get the
Connecticut courts involved quickly, so that speedy judicial remedies
were available when necessary."0 The attachment, early identity of po-
tential defendants, and at least some protection of the materials from the
site were the immediate tangible outcomes of the suit. The Bill of Dis-
covery also served as a forum in which plaintiffs' counsel and, to a much
lesser extent, defense counsel, organized and began to cooperate in the
litigation.
By the end of 1987, the second, and major phase of the litigation had
bpgun. The plaintiffs filed tort suits against three defendants:
-L'Ambiance Plaza Limited Partnership (LPLP), the owner and de-
vqloper of the site, and the corporations and individuals that were its
partners;61
-Texstar Construction Co., the subcontractor responsible for lifting
the concrete slabs into place by means of a system of hydraulic jacks;
57. G. STEPHENSON. CONNECTICUT CIVIL PROCEDURE § 136 (2d ed. 1982).
58. Pottetti v. Clifford, 146 Conn. 252, 150 A.2d 207 (1959).
59. The Complaint sought discovery of all entities and persons connected with the devel-
opment and/or construction project and their insurers. It a.lso sought preliminary docu-
ments relating to the project. Palardy v. Delwood Dev. Int'l, No. 239871 (Conn. Super. Ct.
May 9, 1987). Potential defendants included the owners, developers, general contractor,
multiple subcontractors, product suppliers, and public agencies that provided funding or
authorization for the project.
60. The plaintiffs obtained an injunction against transfer or destruction of any materials
from the site. Collelo v. Delwood Dev. Int'l, No. 239872 (Conn. Super Ct. May 19, 1987).
The Bill of Discovery was granted as to most requests for identification of potential parties.
In the Matter of L'Ambiance Plaza, No. 239822 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 1987).
61. Delwood Development International, Inc., William DeLeo, S. Paul-DeLeo, and Wil-
liam Lone.
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-the city of Bridgeport, for alleged negligence in inspecting and ap-
proving the plans and granting the building permit and in inspecting the
site during construction.
The plaintiffs sued LPLP and Texstar in state and federal court to
avoid jurisdictional problems. They sued the city in state court in the
judicial district of Waterbury. 2 More suits were planned for filing in
early 1988.
By this time the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) had levied the biggest fines in its history against five of the
L'Ambiance contractors for multiple, willful violations of OSHA stan-
dards and the OSHA general duty clause.63 The OSHA charges were
based on an investigation and report by the National Bureau of Stan-
dards, now the National Institute of Standards and Technology, 4 which
was to become the basis for most of the early liability claims. The con-
tractors cited by OSHA were: Texstar Construction Corporation, fined
$2,519,000; TPMI/Macomber, fined $2,475,000; Lift Frame Builders,
Inc., fined $104,000.; Fairfield Testing Lab, Inc., fined $10,000 and
Preforce Corporation, fined $1,000.5 OSHA also referred the matter to
62. Rusillo v. L'Ambiance Plaza Limited Partnership, et al., No. B 88-135 (WWE)
(D.Conn. 1988); Daddona v. L'Ambiance Plaza Limited Partnership, CV 88 00836705
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1988); Daddona v. Texstar Construction Corp., CV 88 128 (D.Conn.
1988); Seiwart v. Texstar Construction Corp., CV 88 0084343 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1988);
Daddona v. City of Bridgeport, CV 87 0082647 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1988). The federal cases
were consolidated before U.S. Judge Warren Eginton in Bridgeport. The state cases were
consolidated before Judge James T. Healy in the Judicial District of Waterbury and desig-
nated "L'Ambiance Plaza Litigation (PID)."
63. An employer can either be charged with violating a specific OSHA standard or with
violating the OSHAct General Duty Clause, 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1982), obligating employers
to maintain a place of employment "free from recognized hazards causing or likely to
cause death or serious physical harm." 29 U.S.C. § 654(i). The L'Ambiance defendants
were cited for numerous violations of the general duty clause, including allowing people to
work under the slabs as they were lifted; engineering errors; improner use of fill around the
foundation; lifting without adequate lateral bracing; defective welds; and other errors in the
lifting jacks. They were also cited for violating standards regarding instruction in safe work
procedures, 29 C.F.R. 1926.21(b)(2) (1989); and regarding the operation of the hydraulic
lifting jacks, 29 C.F.R. 1926.305(a)(1) (1989). See supra note 19.
64. NBS INVESTIGATION, supra note 9.
65. Secretary of Labor v. Texstar Constr. Corp., No. 87-1956, Region I, Settlement
Agreement (United States Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, Nov. 18,
1988); Secretary of Labor v. Lift Frame Builders, Inc., No. 87-1738 Region I, Settlement
Agreement (United States Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, Nov. 21,
1988); Secretary of Labor v. TPMI/Macomber, A Joint Venture, No. 87-1955, Region 1,
Settlement Agreement (United States Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n,
Nov. 18, 1988); Secretary of Labor v. Fairfield Testing Lab, Inc., No. 87-1957, Region 1,
Settlement Agreement (United States Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n,
Nov. 18, 1988); Secretary of Labor v. Preforce Corp., No. 87-1893, Region I, Settlement
Agreement (United States Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, Nov. 18,
1988).
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the U.S. Department of Justice for consideration of criminal prosecution
of the main lift slab contractor, Texstar. 6
Judicial mediation of the L'Ambiance claims can be divided roughly
into two periods: January to July, 1988, in which the panel gathered
information, established relationships with all parties, and obtained gen-
eral commitments to participation in the process, and August to Decem-
ber, 1988, during which the panel obtained definite agreements from
each party as to specific sums of money and other contributions to the
final settlement.
A. The Mediation - Phase One
The federal tort suits were referred to Judge Warren Eginton in
Bridgeport. In January 1988, Judge Eginton approached United States
District Judge Robert C. Zampano, Senior District Judge for the Dis-
trict of Connecticut, and asked him to consider trying to settle the
L'Ambiance suits before litigation proceeded too far. Judge Zampano,
assigned permanently to ADR in the New Haven federal court,67 agreed.
However, because suits had already been filed in both state and federal
court, Judge Zampano decided to work with Connecticut Superior Court
Judge Frank S. Meadow in order to gain jurisdiction over all the cases.
Together, the two were appointed the L'Ambiance Plaza Mediation
Panel, the first such joint federal-state mediation effort devoted to a mass
tort.
By the time the panel became involved, plaintiffs' attorneys had organ-
ized into a Plaintiffs' Attorneys Committee (PAC), with a smaller Plain-
tiffs' Steering Committee (PSC), ready to coordinate litigation and me-
diation activities. An expense fund was set up, with initial contributions
based on the nature of the claims (death or personal injury) and the
expected value of each. Later expenses were to be assessed out of any
ultimate recovery.68 The defendants were less united initially because
each party was more concerned with placing blame on the others than
66. The Justice Department eventually decided not to prosecute. Felsen, Mediation That
Worked: Role of OSHA in L'Ambiance Plaza Settlement, 3 J. OF PERF. OF CONSTRUCTED
FACILITIES 212 (1989). A similar investigation by the Connecticut State Police also failed
to result in any criminal charges. Connecticut Department of Public Safety, Bureau of
State Fire Marshal, News Release April 6, 1988, at 2 ("After reviewing the investigative
results, both State's Attorney Donald Browne and Chief State's Attorney John Kelly
agreed that there was insufficient basis for criminal prosecution because the cause of the
collapse involved neither intentional nor negligent criminal conduct.")
67. See supra text accompanying note 16.
68. Interview with Richard A. Bieder, lead counsel, Plaintiffs' Attorneys Committee, in
Bridgeport, Connecticut (July 13, 1988).
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resolving the dispute. One or two attorneys who represented key clients
did, nevertheless, emerge as spokespersons during the early court hear-
ings on the Bill of Discovery."9
When the mediation began, the key legal and factual issues had begun
to take shape. To a degree, the OSHA report made up for the lack of
discovery and enabled the mediators to suggest with some credibility,
even at the first meetings, which entities were likely to be held responsi-
ble, and why. It is useful at this point to summarize the legal issues that
had thus far emerged at the beginning of the litigation.
B. The Plaintiffs' Issues
1. Workers' Compensation. For the plaintiffs, the most important legal
issues had to do with Connecticut Workers' Compensation law. Under
the exclusive remedy rule, Workers' Compensation is an employee's sole
recourse against an employer for death or injury on the job.70 Because all
the L'Ambiance plaintiffs were injured or killed on the job, they were
barred from suing their own employers at common law. The victims
could pursue tort claims against any responsible third party, but even
this possibility was severely limited by a state law enacted to protect
employers in industries such as construction where there are several con-
tractors and subcontractors with employees exposed to injury. Under the
principal employer rule, as codified in Connecticut and elsewhere, any
contractor who subcontracts out part of the work is protected from com-
mon law tort actions brought by any employees of its subcontractors, and
is responsible for paying Workers' Compensation to subcontractors' em-
ployees as well as its own." The two doctrines together shield contractors
from common law tort actions by the employees of their subcontractors.
As a result, the plaintiffs in L'Ambiance could successfully bring tort
claims only against entities below or parallel to their own employers in
the contractual chain, assuming they could prove liability on the facts.
69. Interview with Kevin Coles, attorney for Texstar Construction Corp., in Bridgeport,
Connecticut (Dec. 26, 1988).
70. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-284 (West 1987 & Supp. 1989). Daily v. New Britain
Mach. Co., 200 Conn. 562, 512 A.2d 893 (1986); Jett v. Dunlap, 179 Conn. 215, 425 A.2d
1263 (1979); DeSantis v. Gaudioso, 39 Conn. Supp. 222, 476 A.2d 149 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1983).
71. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-291 (West 1987). After the L'Ambiance collapse,
Connecticut amended it Principal Employer Statute to provide immunity only when a prin-
cipal employer has actually paid compensation benefits to the injured worker or his family.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-291 (West Supp. 1989) The L'Ambiance litigation, however,
was controlled by prior law, protecting upstream contractors even when they had not pro-
vided Workers' Compensation coverage.
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The plaintiffs hoped to circumvent the exclusive remedy rule by utiliz-
ing the "dual capacity" doctrine. In some states, an employer who acts
in a second capacity, as a product supplier, for example, is liable at com-
mon law for injuries caused in that second capacity.72 The Connecticut
courts have so far been unwilling to create exceptions to the exclusive
remedy rule.73 The L'Ambiance defendants, however, were never sure
that the Connecticut courts would continue to interpret the rule so
strictly. With such compelling facts, a court might hold that a subcon-
tractor who made a product used on the site, such as the shearhead col-
lars, was a product supplier and strictly liable for damages caused by a
defect in the product. Moreover, the defendants suspected that few trial
judges would be willing to grant summary judgment based on an exclu-
sive remedy defense in such a highly visible case. There would have to be
a trial and perhaps appeals to finally settle the issue.
2. Immunity. The plaintiffs claimed negligence against the City of.
Bridgeport and the Connecticut Housing Finance Authority (CHFA),
neither of which was shielded from common law liability by the Work-
ers' Compensation statutes. They hoped to show that both were liable for
negligence in approving the engineering specifications for the building
and in failing to supervise and inspect the construction in progress. How-
ever, as a rule public officials are protected by immunity from such
claims unless a plaintiff can show that the official wrongfully performed
a ministerial, rather than a discretionary, duty.74 As part of its 1986
Tort Reform effort, moreover, Connecticut's legislature had explicitly
immunized municipalities and their officials from liability for the issu-
ance of any permit when to do so involves a discretionary function. The
only exception is for reckless disregard for health or safety.75 The plain-
tiffs, therefore, had to meet a heavy burden when they pursued their
claims against the city.
72. Bell v. Industrial Vangas, Inc., 30 Cal. 3d 268, 637 P.2d 266, 179 Cal. Rptr. 30
(1981); Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952).
73. Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 491 A.2d 368 (1985). While L'Ambiance
was pending, the Supreme Court once again refused to liberalize its interpretation of the
rule. Panaro v. Electrolux Corp., 208 Conn. 589, 545 A.2d 1086 (1988).
74. Wright v. Brown, 167 Conn. 464, 356 A.2d 176 (1975); Pluhowsky v. City of New
Haven, 151 Conn. 337, 197 A.2d 645 (1964). See Maccarrone, Connecticut Tort Reform
Act and Municipalities and Building Officials' Liability, 20 CONN. L. Rav. 203 (1987).
75. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557n(b) (West Supp. 1989).
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C. The Defendants' Issues
The key legal issues for the defendants, including those who had not
yet been sued, 7  concerned contract and indemnity claims, Workers'
Compensation, and OSHA fines. The panel often referred to all these as
the "commercial claims."
1. Contract Claims. A large problem the defendants had to overcome
was their attitude. They thought of themselves as plaintiffs or as victims
of the collapse instead of perpetrators. They were not paid for work they
had performed, they lost the value of jobs they had contracted to per-
form, and the firms most heavily implicated in the collapse were in or
close to bankruptcy."7 The city had large claims for reimbursement for
its cleanup and rescue costs, and CHFA was intent on foreclosing on its
mortgage. Most contractors and the owner-developer really were plain-
tiffs in a variety of upstream and downstream contract claims for subro-
gation, indemnification, or breach of contract. L'Ambiance Plaza Lim-
ited Partnership (LPLP) believed, however, that it had been the victim
of negligence by one or more subcontractors, and it relied on an indem-
nity clause in its contract with TPMI/Macomber entitling it to indemni-
fication for all its losses under Connecticut law.78 Its rights against
TPMI, which had hired and supervised those subcontractors, were fur-
ther secured by a $12 million performance bond on which George Ma-
comber was personal surety. To the extent that LPLP collected, Ma-
comber stood to lose. TPMI/Macomber intended to pursue its
indemnification rights under its contract with Lift Frame.7 LPLP also
had a builders' risk policy that it claimed covered it for all losses stem-
ming from the destruction of the building.
Indemnity can be implied as well as express. A subcontractor who is
determined to be a "primarily liable party,"' may be held liable to other
76. See supra note 25 and infra text accompanying notes 99 and 100.
77. Texstar Construction Corp. had filed a petition in bankruptcy in Texas where it had
its principle place of business. Lift Frame Builders, Inc. and George Macomber had lost
several other contracts after the collapse. TPMI went out of business after losing approxi-
mately $14 million in contracts. Interview with Thomas Murtha, attorney for TPMI/Ma-
comber, in Bridgeport, Connecticut (July 18, 1988).
78. Alpha Crane Service, Inc. v. Capital Crane Co., 6 Conn. App. 60, 504 A.2d 1376
(1986), cert. denied, Aparo v. United Technologies Corp., 199 Conn. 807, 508 A.2d 769
(1986).
79. J. SWEET. SWEET ON CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY CONTRACTS: MAJOR AIA DOCU-
MENTS, AIA Document A401, Standard Form of Agreement Between Contractor and Sub-
contractor, P. 4.6 (1987).
80. Therrien v. Safeguard Mfg. Co., 180 Conn. 91, 429 A.2d 808 (1980); Kaplan v.
Merberg Wrecking Corp., 152 Conn. 405, 207 A.2d 732 (1965). See also J. SWEET, supra
note 79, at 291-92.
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contractors who suffer loss as a result of its negligence.81 Thus Texstar
and Lift Frame and other subcontractors who were allegedly responsible
for the collapse had to defend themselves against their colleagues, even
as they pursued their own claims to recoup some of the devastating eco-
nomic losses they had suffered. There were also numerous upstream
claims by various entities seeking payment for work they had done either
on the job or during the rescue effort. Some of these were secured by a
payment bond posted by TPMI/Macomber. Others were unsecured. The
claims for clean up work were substantial, many reaching hundreds of
thousands of dollars.
2. Tort Reform. Recent tort reform legislation in Connecticut further
encouraged the multiplicity of defendants' claims. In 1986, the legisla-
ture abolished joint and several liability, a doctrine that made any one
tortfeasor liable to the plaintiff for the full amount of the damages, with
the ability to seek indemnification against the co-tortfeasors in separate
proceedings.82 In its place, the legislature made tortfeasors liable only for
their proportionate share of recoverable damages, but to take advantage
of this new rule all defendants must be joined in the original plaintiffs'
case.83 The result in the case of L'Ambiance Plaza was to create strong
incentives for each contractor to bring into the mediation every other
party on the site with any potential liability.
3. Workers' Compensation. In addition to all of the tort and contract
claims there were claims of the various Workers' Compensation carriers,
who were subrogated to the plaintiffs' negligence and products claims
against third parties. Even though many of the contractors were shielded
from direct actions by the plaintiffs, a contractor who pays (or whose
insurance carrier pays) Workers' Compensation is by statute entitled to
subrogation as to any employee's claim against a third party for dam-
ages, up to the amount of compensation paid.8 In L'Ambiance Plaza,
the Workers' Compensation carriers insisted that they be able to pursue
their subrogation rights against any contractors who were primarily lia-
ble for the accident. Those claims, moreover, would be based on exactly
the same proof of negligence as a suit by the employee would have
81. Alpha Crane Service, Inc. v. Capitol Crane Co., 6 Conn. App. 60, 77, 504 A.2d
1376, 1386, cert. denied, Aparo v. United Technologies Corp., 199 Conn. 807, 508 A.2d
769 (1986).
82. Fox v. Fox, 168 Conn. 592, 362 A.2d 854 (1975); Gionfriddo v. Gartenhaus Cafe,
15 Conn. App. 392, 546 A.2d 284 (1988).
83. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West Supp. 1989). The statute was amended
after the L'Ambiance collapse but before suits were filed, and the parties anticipated sig-
nificant disputes construing the new statute and deciding which version would apply.
84. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-293 (West 1987). The employer may sue the third
party directly or may join in a suit brought by the employee to recover for past or future
compensation payments.
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been.85 The total claims for subrogation of compensation payments came
to over $1 million by the time of the settlement.
4. OSHA. OSHA pursued its own interests in L'Ambiance Plaza. To
maintain its credibility as a serious enforcement agent of workplace
safety, it cited five defendants for willful violations of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, and levied total fines of over $5 million.8 6 In view
of the magnitude of the deaths and what the agency considered reckless
disregard by the contractors of their statutory duties there was no doubt
that OSHA considered this a major case that it wanted to prosecute
fully.87 OSHA's two main goals were to sustain its charges of willful
violations and to impose a significant penalty. At the same time, the
agency recognized that for humanitarian reasons it would probably have
to reduce its initial fines. There was not enough money, from insurance
coverage or other assets, to meet the plaintiffs' demands and still pay the
fines. The plaintiffs' attorneys from the start made the point to the public
that every dollar to OSHA would be a dollar taken from the victims'
wives and children.88 The defendants contested the OSHA citations, so
the case proceeded to a hearing before an administrative law judge for
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) for
the Boston Region.8
D. Lift Frame Builders - An Example
Lift Frame Builders furnishes a perfect example of the complexity of
defendants' claims. Lift Frame was at the center of the liability contro-
versy because it was the lift slab contractor in charge of all lift slab work
done on L'Ambiance Plaza and it came out fighting. It sued everyone it
could, and as a result found itself sued in return. Lift Frame first filed
suit against Bridgeport alleging negligence in the permit and inspection
process. It also intervened in the plaintiffs' suits asserting its subrogation
rights as a payor of Workers' Compensation. It sued TPMI/Macomber
for payment due under its contract. TPMI/Macomber, through its per-
formance bond carrier, counterclaimed for indemnification based on the
same contract. Texstar was brought into this suit as a third party de-
fendant, and it immediately counterclaimed against Lift Frame. At the
85. DeSantis v. Gaudioso, 39 Conn. Supp. 222, 476 A.2d 149 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1983);
Cirrito v. Continental Can Co., 519 F. Supp. 638 (D. Conn. 1981).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 64 and 65.
87. Felsen, supra note 66, at 3.
88. Id.
89. Eventually the hearing was stayed pending the outcome of the mediation. See infra
note 96.
[Vol. 5:2 1990]
THE L'AMBIANCE PLAZA MEDIATION
same time, several subcontractors of Lift Frame sued it demanding con-
tract damages.90 Lift Frame also took the lead in the defense against the
OSHA citations and its own $104,000 fine.
VI. MEDIATION STYLES AND EMERGING THEMES
Against this background, the mediation panel took on the task of
resolving all these issues and divergent interests into a cohesive and fair
settlement. Judge Zampano and Judge Meadow were very strong, ac-
tivist mediators.91 From the beginning, they played a strong management
role, setting timetables, creating and sticking to a strict schedule, and
fashioning the details of the settlement. In many ways the panel acted
more as nonbinding arbitrators than as mediators. The judges made
known their own conclusions as to the responsibility for the collapse.
They also decided which entities should be brought into the mediation
process, which of those were most likely to be held responsible for the
deaths and injuries, and the precise amount of each plaintiff's settlement
package, which they presented on a take it or leave it basis. Of the two
judges, Judge Zampano was the more activist, and he is often credited
with the mediation's success. Judge Meadow, however, played a key sup-
pprt role. He worked out the details of the process and the settlement
amounts with Judge Zampano and made sure the state courts respected
the informal stay needed for a successful mediation. Zampano, however,
with his experience in ADR, made most of the key decisions that shaped
the process.9 2
Early in the mediation a key strategy developed by the two judges was
that they would not play the traditional mediator's role of helping the
parties to negotiate their own agreement. 93 In fact, the parties were de-
liberately kept from interacting with one another. Virtually all negotia-
90. Interview with Jeffrey A. Blueweiss, attorney for Lift Frame Builders, Inc., in
Bridgeport, Connecticut (August 26, 1988).
91. They typified what two authors have termed "muscle mediators." J. FOLBERG & A.
TAYLOR, MEDIATION 130 (1984), reprinted in DIsPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 7, at 101
("In muscle mediation the mediator, sometimes resembling a 'closet arbitrator,' tells the
parties what is fair and appropriate. Muscle mediators. . .inform the disputants of the best
'voluntary' resolution or narrow the options to preclude effective choices.")
92. This conclusion is based on numerous interviews with participants in the mediation
and with those who observed the process closely. One attorney suggested that the two
judges were perfectly matched to the task at hand. Judge Zampano, a natural leader and
skilled at interpersonal relations, was the perfect choice to win the cooperation of the di-
verse parties involved. Judge Meadow was content to play a quieter role, providing critical
input and support but never attempting to compete for control or leadership.
93. See L. SUsSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, supra note 27, at 140-50, 162-65; D. PROVINE,
supra note 5, at 21-24.
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tion was between the mediation panel and the individual parties. The
best visual image of the L'Ambiance mediation is that of a solid rubber
ball with spikes protruding from it in all directions. The ball is the judi-
cial system, the largest part of which is the mediation panel. Some of the
spikes are plaintiffs, some are defendants, many are both, depending on
the various relationships among the different spikes. They only communi-
cate with one another through the center ball, either by participating in
the mediation process or by (occasionally) filing motions in court. So
strictly was this pattern adhered to that no plaintiff knew what any other
plaintiff would receive, and no defendant knew how much any other had
paid until the very end of the process when the agreements were an-
nounced in open court and became a matter of public record.94
By January 25, 1988, the two judges had sent a memo to all parties
and potential parties, notifying them of the mediation and requesting all
attorneys to stop filing new suits and to postpone any further pretrial
procedures, including discovery, except as necessary for compliance with
any statute of limitations or other time requirements. 95 The state and
federal courts cooperated in staying further proceedings. 8
This early start to mediation, only nine months after the collapse, gave
the panel an important strategic advantage. The most expensive discov-
ery and motion practice lay ahead. By imposing an unofficial stay on
further litigation, the panel was able to keep the costs of settlement low
and the costs of continuing to litigate extremely high by comparison.
Only the OSHA administrative proceedings continued, and those were
eventually stayed as well. 7
One problem for the panel was obtaining the cooperation of all the
entities that had not yet been sued. The ease with which this was done
94. Even the insurance carriers that insured more than one defendant took care to han-
dle each insured's defense separately. The Hartford, for example, did not know the total
amount it would pay into the settlement until the week before the agreements were final-
ized. Interview with Harold Levy, General Counsel, and Jeffrey Norris, Associate Counsel,
The Hartford Insurance Group, in Hartford, Connecticut (Feb. 16, 1989). Although some
members of the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee knew the contents of all the plaintiffs' set-
tlement offers, none revealed these figures to their clients. Interview with Richard Bieder,
lead counsel, Plaintiffs' Steering Committee, at Pound Ridge, New York (Dec. 9, 1988).
95. "L'Ambiance Plaza Litigation: State-Federal Mediation Panel," Memo to all par-
ties, January 25, 1988.
96. The Connecticut Supreme Court also cooperated by delaying any ruling on the ap-
peal of Lift Frame from certain testing orders granted by Judge Landau.
97. Marselli, Judge Awaiting Mediation in L'Ambiance Plaza, The Bridgeport Post,
July 26 1988, at 10. The stay was critical to Judge Zampano's strategy, and he pressed
OSHA to agree to it. Zampano wanted to avoid any investigation by the defense that
might inject new liability issues into the mediation discussions. He sensed early that suc-
cess depended to a great degree on maintaining a high level of uncertainty as to the merits
of the various claims.
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provides an interesting example of the enormous powers judicial
mediators have at their disposal. Ultimately, all the potential defendants
came to the mediation sessions after receiving letters from Judge
Zampano and Judge Meadow inviting them to attend. The judges them-
selves recognized the difficulties in obtaining this degree of cooperation. 8
The potential defendants' initial decision to attend the mediation sessions
was due in part to the prestige of the judges requesting their presence.
As one lawyer noted, "You don't lightly turn down a request from a
federal judge." 9
For several reasons, the mediation had to include potential as well as
actual defendants. From the beginning it was apparent that there was no
single deep pocket defendant. The Bill of Discovery had revealed a large
number of grossly underinsured entities. The owners of the property had
a $1,000,000 liability policy, as did the general contractor. The two lift
slab contractors, Lift Frame and Texstar, carried $3.5 million and $3
million respectivel , the two largest policies available.100 The city of
Bridgeport was self-insured and nearly bankrupt. To obtain enough
money for forty-two plaintiffs' claims, there would have to be contribu-
tions by many different entities.
The mediation panel met with plaintiffs and defendants throughout
February, March, and April 1988.1°1 At all of the meetings, parties were
told to appear not only with their attorneys, but also with their principles
or any other persons with settlement authority. Judge Zampano met with
the Worker's Compensation carriers that had been paying benefits on
behalf of all the victims, and he also traveled to Boston to meet with
OSHA's Regional Representatives.
The panel did not seek a firm commitment from anyone on a fixed
amount of money at these early meetings. Instead, at the close of each
meeting, the parties were asked to merely indicate whether they would
commit to continuing with the mediation, whether they were "on board"
98. "In requesting that persons meet with the Mediation Panel, the Mediation Panel
noted that it had no power to order them to appear, but stated it believed there were
'strong social and moral' reasons for them to do so." Interim Report, supra note 23, at 6.
See also L'Ambiance Plaza Litigation State-Federal Mediation Panel 3 (Jan. 25, 1989).
99. There is an analogy in the Agent Orange settlement for a judge bringing nonparties
into a case for negotiation purposes. Judge Weinstein, when he took over the Agent Orange
litigation, ordered the United States and several chemical companies into the discussions,
even though a previous judge had dismissed them from the case. The first judge, Weinstein
maintained, had never signed a formal judgment of dismissal. P. SCHUCK, supra note 11,
at 114.
100. Information extrapolated from the list of Contributions to Death and Personal In-
jury Settlement Fund, Special Settlement Proceedings, In Re: L'Ambiance Plaza Litiga-
tion, (Dec. 1, 1988), which indicate the amount contributed by each defendant.
101. Interim Report, supra note 23, it 8.
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or not. In addition, the judges accomplished several critical preliminary
tasks. They gathered information about potential theories of liability,
learned how much insurance coverage was available and what other as-
sets could be reached if necessary, and identified other potential defend-
ants and determined which defendants planned to file contract claims
and for how much. 0 2 Whenever any new entity was mentioned, it was
contacted by the panel and asked to come to a meeting. Any entity men-
tioned in the OSHA and state police reports was contacted by the panel
and asked to appear. The net was thus cast wider and wider, until over
seventy defendants were involved, many of whom had only the remotest
connection to L'Ambiance. One midwestern attorney was summoned to
meet with the panel, for example, because his client had made a testing
instrument used by Fairfield Testing, even though there was never any
suggestion that the instrument had any connection to the collapse. An-
other supplied some screws that were used in some of the shearheads,
but was also never cited as having anything to do with the collapse.1"'
In this way Zampano tried to bring together enough parties to create a
settlement fund big enough to satisfy the plaintiffs' minimum needs. To
justify the presence of so many minor defendants, he did two things: he
threatened everyone with long and expensive potential litigation, and he
suggested that those who participated would also have their commercial
claims resolved as part of the mediation. Consequently, this stick and
carrot approach enabled Zampano to ultimately bring about the global
settlement.
Several themes emerged at these early mediation sessions that were
carefully calculated to bring the parties to agreement. One theme was
the major cost of continuing litigation, both financial and emotional. The
case would involve "hundreds of parties and over a thousand causes of
action," he wrote to the parties. It would create "profound emotional
stress and economic strain."1 4 He and Judge Meadow would "make
every effort to settle the several hundred pending and potential lawsuits
generated by the collapse."' 0 5 By the end of April the panel had met
with "over 250 parties, potential parties, lawyers, representatives of in-
102. Id. Interview with Judge Robert C. Zampano, United States District Judge, Dis-
trict of Connecticut, in New Haven, Connecticut (June 24, 1988).
103. Interview with George Holmes, attorney for Fairfield Testing Laboratory in Fair-
field, Connecticut (Sept. 19, 1988), and interview with Edward Hennessey, attorney for the
City of Bridgeport, in Hartford, Connecticut (June 19, 1989).
104. L'Ambiance Plaza Litigation State-Federal Mediation Panel 1 (Jan. 25, 1988).
105. Memorandum to Plaintiffs - L'Ambiance Plaza Litigation, from Hon. Robert C.
Zampano, Hon. Frank S. Meadow, L'Ambiance Plaza Mediation Panel (Apr. 29, 1988).
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surers, and other interested persons," and over fifty people were still to
be interviewed.108 These ideas were repeated at every mediation session.
Judge Zampano also kept everyone acutely aware of the time it would
take to litigate all the cases. Seven to ten years was the most frequent
estimate for concluding all trials and appeals. By settling, everybody
could put the collapse behind them and get on with their lives, or their
businesses. For all of the small contractors and subcontractors, and even
for the developers, this struck a responsive chord. Most of the defendants
were small business people who had to resolve the case to get back in
business. Even the city of Bridgeport was strongly motivated by this no-
tion of finality. As long as the case dragged on, it would be like a skull
and crossbones looming over Bridgeport, kept in the public mind because
the press would highlight every move in the litigation. Above all, Mayor
Tom Bucci wanted to get the matter done with.107
Another theme was uncertainty. The legal issues as to liability and
even some of the commercial claims were not clear-cut. No party could
be confident of success on the merits. Zampano and Meadow deliber-
ately kept any discussion of the legal issues out of the mediation.108 One
party had prepared a three inch thick loose-leaf binder full of research
on why it could not ultimately be held liable to the plaintiffs. When the
party first met with the panel, Judge Zampano announced, "I don't want
to hear any law, any facts, any theories of liability. I just want to know
how much you are going to pay."'09
When the attorneys did allude to the merits, Zampano was always
discouraging, especially to the defendants. When Zampano addressed
the defendants he stated over and over that a jury would simply look at
the tragedy, see an available defendant, and then award the moon. All
ypu have to do, suggested Zampano, is to show a picture of the site the
day before and the day after the collapse, tell the jury these are the
participants and these are the deaths and injuries, and the jury will
award the plaintiffs what they ask." 0 The jury would see "those widows
in their black dresses holding their rosaries for the rest of their lives,"
was one of his favorite expressions. To the plaintiffs, he repeatedly noted
that even if they won a substantial jury verdict, that verdict would have
to withstand numerous appeals, and afterwards would probably be uncol-
lectible. Most of the contractors would be out of business or bankrupt by
106. Id.
107. Interview with Edward Hennessey, supra note 103.
108. Interview with Judge Robert C. Zanpano, United States District Judge, District of
Connecticut, in New Haven, Connecticut (Jan. 17, 1989).
109. Interview with Edward Hennessey, supra note 103.
110. Interview with Harold Levy, supra note 94.
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the time they actually had to pay any damages. Whatever a jury
awarded, the plaintiffs would receive little more than the insurance cov-
erage held by each defendant, and that was available now."'
The third theme throughout the mediation was the moral imperative
that arose from the terrible nature of the tragedy, and the need to do the
right thing by getting some quick relief to the victims' families.
Zampano always kept the discussions "on the moral high ground.""'
The defendants were especially susceptible to this approach. According
to one attorney, all the defendants "hate to see anyone get killed," and
they all wanted to contribute something to the settlement."' Construc-
tion workers, whether bosses or laborers, are a close-knit group. Some of
the contractors had relatives among the victims." 4 Most of them had
worked closely with their employees for years, and often appeared on
behalf of the plaintiffs before the mediation panel." 5 To the City of
Bridgeport and to OSHA, Zampano hammered away at the public na-
ture of the tragedy and the public interest of government to help settle
the case. The judges capitalized on these issues to such an extent that at
times the process seemed less like a lawsuit and more like a charity
pledge drive to help the L'Ambiance Plaza victims.
At the meetings both judges also sought to establish the parties' trust
in the mediation process. Trust was established and maintained in three
ways. First, the panel was thoroughly knowledgeable about the case.
Before any meetings with the parties, Judge Zampano spent days going
through the files and learning all he could about L'Ambiance and other
mass torts. He never ceased educating himself about every aspect of the
case. Before meeting with the Workers' Compensation carriers, for ex-
ample, he traveled to New York City to confer with an expert in com-
pensation and subrogation." 6 At every mediation session he garnered in-
formation on the parties' theories of the case and the bases for their
11. Interview with Richard Bieder, supra note 94; interview with Garrett Moore, liai-
son counsel, Plaintiffs' Steering Committee, in New Haven, Connecticut (Oct. 12, 1988).
112. The initial memo to the parties from Judge Zampano concluded, "Finally, we rec-
ognize that many persons and entities requested to attend the mediation sessions have no
legal obligation to do so. However, Judge Meadow and I firmly believe that there is a
strong social and moral obligation to do so, and we urge your cooperation." L'Ambiance
Plaza Litigation State-Federal Mediation Panel (Jan. 25, 1988). All attorneys interviewed
noted this factor.
113. Interview with Thomas Murtha, supra note 77.
114. One of the principals in Texstar had a nephew who was killed. Interview with Ke-
vin Coles, supra note 69.
115. Interview with Judge Robert C. Zampano, supra note 108.
116. Id.
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claims against other entities. His goal was always to be ready to answer
every allegation and every argument that could arise.117
Second, the judges dealt directly with the parties. Attendance at medi-
ation sessions was mandatory for attorneys and their clients,118 meaning
anyone with authority to settle. Plaintiffs (the legal representatives of the
deceased victims, and the actual victims in the personal injury cases)
were requested to come, along with their attorneys, to the mediation ses-
sions. Other family members could attend if they wished. Defendants
were to appear with trial counsel, the CEO of. the corporation and in-
house counsel. Insurance companies had to appear with trial counsel,
claims managers, and in-house counsel. Finally, any individual had to
appear with an attorney, and the city of Bridgeport had to be repre-
sented by its trial counsel, the mayor, and corporate counsel.
This approach was important for a number of reasons. It helped to
establish trust and confidence in the judges on the part of the parties
themselves. It gave to the proceedings a sense of justice and fairness, at
times seeming, in the minds of the participants, to replicate the due pro-
cess they would have expected from a full trial of the case. Each party
had an opportunity to tell his or her story directly to the judges. The fact
that these judges had no actual power to grant them any relief made
very little difference to the parties. They had an opportunity to be heard
by a very sympathetic listener who embodied the prestige and power of
the judicial system."19 Judge Zampano is able to generate enormous re-
spect and affection from lay people who are involved in litigation, be-
117. On the importance of a judge being well-informed before beginning settlement dis-
cussions, see Brazil, supra note 6, at 28.
118. "It is mandatory that trial attorneys attend the mediation sessions. An attorney
who is or expects to be on trial on that date shall forthwith inform the presiding judge of
his commitment before the mediation panel. If difficulty is encountered in being released to
attend a mediation session, immediately inform either Judge Meadow or Judge Zampano
of the problem." L'Ambiance Plaza Litigation State-Federal Mediation Panel app. A (Jan.
25, 1988).
119. Judge Zampano took every possible opportunity to communicate his sympathy to
the plaintiffs. On April 29, 1988, for example, the panel sent a letter to announce the
individual plaintiffs' meetings. In that letter Judge Zampano wrote, "Judge Meadow and I
express our sincerest condolences to you on the anniversary of the tragic L'Ambiance Plaza
Building collapse. The terrible effects of the catastrophe undoubtedly bring daily remem-
brances and sorrows; the anniversary only heightens the sadness as the disaster is "relived"
in memory and media. You have our deepest sympathy." The letter also became an oppor-
tunity to stress, once again, the themes that Judge Zampano hoped would make settlement
attractive: the urgent need to settle early, "to decrease the profound emotional stress and
economic strain upon the victims...," the panel's intent to make "every effort to settle the
several hundred pending and potential lawsuits generated by the collapse;" the fact that the
judges had "conferred with over 250 parties, potential parties, lawyers, representatives of
insurers, and other interested persons"; and that "[m]uch more needs to be done ... .
Memorandum to Plaintiffs - L'Ambiance Plaza Litigation, from Judge Robert C. Zampano
and Judge Frank S. Meadow, L'Ambiance Mediation Panel (Apr. 29, 1988).
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cause he is a master at demystifying the legal system. By dealing di-
rectly with the parties, he established a personal relationship with
everyone who had the ability to make the ultimate settlement decision.
At each session he made sure that each participant had a chance to
speak and was respected by the panel and the other participants, no mat-
ter how contentious the discussions.
Third, the panel insisted on, and maintained, complete confidentiality
throughout the proceedings. The initial memo from the two judges indi-
cated that, "[tihe mediation sessions shall be regarded as confidential,
'off the record,' and informal. All oral statements and documents shall
be deemed submitted for settlement purposes only. ' 120 The confidential
nature of the proceedings was stressed often at the mediation sessions.
The first meeting with the plaintiffs exemplified Judge Zampano's
character and his approach as a mediator. On March 1, 1988, the panel
met with all the plaintiffs, their attorneys, and any family members who
wanted to be there. The Judge appeared without a robe and began by
expressing his deep sympathy for their loss. He told them he understood
how hard it was to lose a close relative in a sudden accident because he
himself had experienced the same kind of loss. He continued by explain-
ing the mediation process and the alternatives available, putting the al-
ternatives in a very negative light. A trial might take as long as seven
years, to be followed by appeals. He also explained in detail the state
and federal court systems and the differences between civil and criminal
cases. This was followed by a discussion of the role of mediators and his
view of the mediation process. He explained the Connecticut Tort Re-
form Act, and the difficulties it presented for the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs
and their families were encouraged to ask questions and discuss their
opinions. One plaintiff, the brother of a decedent, articulated a plan to
lobby for repeal of the Tort Reform Act. Another, whose son was killed,
discussed how he formed the Bridgeport Safety Awareness Group
(BSAG), and he distributed BSAG literature.12 1
At this first round of meetings, Judge Zampano moved the parties to-
wards integrative bargaining by stressing the themes of costs, complex-
ity, time, uncertainty, morality, and trust. He made the parties' alterna-
tives to settlement very unattractive by keeping the probability of success
uncertain at best. He made graphic the advantages of trading time for
dollars; settling early for less money would in the end net the parties far
more than any other resolution. In addition, Zampano increased geomet-
120. L'Ambiance Plaza Litigation State-Federal Mediation Panel 2 (Jan. 25, 1988).
121. Interview with Linda Grossberg, paralegal assistant, Koskoff, Koskoff and Bieder,
P.C,, lead counsel, Plaintiffs' Steering Committee, in Bridgeport, Connecticut (June 6,
1988).
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rically the opportunities for integrative, nonzero-sum bargaining by
bringing in numerous potential parties and by putting the commercial
claims on the table. While such methods may appear to make the case
more complex and expensive to litigate, it ultimately created opportuni-
ties for trade-offs that made settlement attractive. Eventually, these
techniques would bring the parties to the point where their reservation
prices, and thus their interests in settlement, converged.
VII. A SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL
The next step in the mediation process was to create actual proposals
for settlement. The panel had a good estimate of the money available,
mostly through insurance, from the defendants. The panel also concluded
that certain defendants were more culpable than others and so should be
required to contribute more to the settlement. Though not revealed at
first, three categories of defendants were established by the panel so as to
better allocate contributions to a settlement fund. Group One included
those parties primarily responsible for the collapse. Group Two included
those parties with "questionable responsibility in terms of potential lia-
bility;" and Group Three included those with no potential liability. 122
The parties that made up Group One consisted of the owner-developer,
the general contractor, Lift Frame, Texstar, the architects, the suppliers
of concrete, Fairfield Testing Laboratories, the city of Bridgeport and
CHFA. These parties were expected to contribute their total insurance
coverage and, in some instances, their personal assets . 23 Group Two de-
fendants were asked to contribute a percentage of total policy limits, and
Group Three defendants were asked only for their "estimated costs of
defense." 24 Group Three included companies that the panel expected
might be brought into future litigation and so would have to face defense
costs, in spite of their lack of involvement with the collapse.
122. Interim Report, supra note 23, at 13.
123. Id. See also Memorandum to All Parties, Potential Parties, and Interested Persons,
from the L'Ambiance Mediation Panel, Re Death and Personal Injury Cases - Final Settle-
ment Conferences (July 21, 1988) [hereinafter Memorandum to All Parties]. Those con-
tributing personal assets were TPMI/Macomber, Texstar, Liftframe, George Macomber,
and Delwood Development International, Inc., the general partner in L'Ambiance Plaza
Limited Partnership.
124. Interim Report, supra note 23, at 13.
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Plaintiffs Package
Even though the commercial claims had been brought into the negoti-
ations, both Judge Zampano and Judge Meadow assumed that once the
personal injury claims were resolved, the other matters in dispute would
also settle. They therefore turned to the task of setting an actual settle-
ment figure. During June, 1988, the panel met separately with each of
the plaintiffs and their representatives. Victims' families and friends
came with their attorneys to Judge Zampano's chambers, where they
talked about the deceased, his family life, his work, his hobbies, the kind
of person he was, and the hardships faced by his survivors. Photo albums
were passed around. A television and VCR were on hand for viewing
videos of the victims and their families. Several of the witnesses were
survivors of the collapse. They told of watching their friends die and of
the long and fruitless rescue attempts. "It was like going to twenty-eight
wakes and twenty-eight funerals," said Judge Zampano of these
meetings. 125
The judges called these "informal 'hearings in damages,' ",128 but they
were much more. For the plaintiffs, the individual meetings served more
than anything else as substitutes for a trial. Moreover, the meetings were
another opportunity for the panel to build the trust and respect of the
plaintiffs in the judges and in the mediation process. The meetings also
had a practical purpose. Attorneys were told to present summaries of
each plaintiff's economic damages: lost wages, estimates of future earn-
ings and fringe benefits, and life expectancy.127 Judges Zampano and
Meadow also questioned the families closely about their needs. "Tell me
about your dreams," Judge Zampano asked. 28 He wanted to learn of
any special expenses faced by each family. Some had a sick or disabled
125. Interview with Judge Robert C. Zampano, supra note 103. Emotionally, these
meetings were the worst part of the case for Judge Zampano. Interview with Judge Robert
C. Zampano, supra note 109. Attorneys for the plaintiffs also talked about how painful
these sessions were. One of the rescue workers, an ironworker, told the panel that he had
heard about the collapse on the radio, while on vacation in Georgia. Knowing that a close
friend, whom he had brought into the ironworkers union, was on the site, he was unable to
sleep that night. Finally he got up, drove straight to Bridgeport, and went immediately to
the site to join the rescue effort. "I dug until my hands were torn and bleeding," he told the
judges. Then he collapsed, sobbing, unable to continue. Interview with Richard Bieder, lead
counsel, Plaintiffs' Steering Committee, in Bridgeport, Connecticut (July 13, 1988). An-
other lawyer prepared a videotape of two girls whose father had been killed. Both this
attorney and Judge Zampano reported being moved to tears whenever this tape was shown.
Interview with Judge Robert C. Zampano, supra note 108; interview with Garrett Moore,
supra note 112.
126. Memorandum to All Parties, supra note 123, at I.
127. Interview with Richard Bieder, supra note 125.
128. Interview with Judge Robert C. Zampano, supra note 108.
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child or an elderly parent to support. Others faced large debts, or the
expenses of a college education.
By the end of June, the two judges believed they could fix the mini-
mum amount that would be needed to settle all the personal injury and
death cases. They had established a rough estimate of how much money
might be available from the defendants. On July 21, the panel sent a
memo scheduling what it called the "Final Settlement Conferences" in
the death and personal injury cases.129 On September 9, 1988, the panel
distributed separate opinions indicating a minimum settlement amount
for each plaintiff.130 All of the plaintiffs had two weeks to respond. The
amounts were eventually presented as nonnegotiable, all-or-nothing
packages. For the mediation to continue, the plaintiffs had to un-
nanimously accept the proposals.131 This tactic placed considerable pres-
sure on the plaintiffs. No one wanted to be responsible for sabotaging the
entire mediation.
The July 21, 1988, memo also scheduled meetings with groups of de-
fendants "to secure the minimum settlement fund" and to "discuss and
draft the appropriate papers."'3 2 But the defendants were forewarned:
there would be meetings to draft papers for settlement, but also to draft
"the appropriate moving papers so that the plaintiffs can prosecute their
actions against the 'non-settling defendants' by way of formal judicial
proceedings in state and federal forums."' 3
This seemed quite an optimistic plan as of July 21, 1988, particularly
because no defendant had yet committed to pay anything. The memo
served, however, as another source of pressure on all the parties, creating
the impression that considerable momentum was building towards settle-
ment and that no one would want to risk litigating alone. The memo
again noted the high price of litigation: "[W]hile these dates and attend-
ance requirements may be inconvenient to some, they certainly will be
exceedingly less inconvenient than the weeks, months, and years of in-
129. Memorandum to All Parties, supra note 123.
130. Id. at 1. The opinions represented a minimum amount that the panel believed
would constitute a fair settlement in each case. In the end, the actual awards were higher
because more was contributed by the defendants. The awards were carefully tailored to
each family, depending on the number and age of the victims' dependents, past earnings,
needs of the surviving families and, for the injured plaintiffs, the extent of the injuries and
their future needs. For a summary of the basis for the awards, see Interim Report, supra
note 23, at 11. Payments to families with children included lump sums plus structured
payments to last for several years or, in some cases, for life, each based on estimates of the
costs of care and education. Parents or elderly relatives received lump sums.
131. Interview with Judge Robert C. Zampano, supra note 108.
132. Memorandum to All Parties, supra note 123.
133. Id. at 2.
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convenience involved in discovery, depositions, and trial if these cases are
not settled at this time."' 34
By September 9, 1988, the minimum settlement proposals were deliv-
ered to the plaintiffs' steering committee, and by September 22, 1988, all
of the plaintiffs had accepted. The panel worked hard to prepare the
plaintiffs for settlement. Immediate payment was perceived as far better
than litigating against possibly judgment-proof defendants. The amounts
were well within the parameters of an acceptable settlement, given the
costs of continuing the litigation and the probabilities of ultimately col-
lecting a jury verdict. The next, and most difficult phase of the mediation
was about to begin.
VIII. THE MEDIATION - PHASE Two
A. The Commercial Claims
The awards accepted by the plaintiffs were, in Judge Zampano's
words, "minimum settlement figures."' 35 If the panel could obtain more,
the plaintiffs would receive more. The minimum awards totalled $24 mil-
lion. Next, the panel negotiated with the defendants to reach a commit-
ment for that amount. The panel estimated from its earlier meetings
with the defendants that it could collect at least $21 million, based on
what the defendants and their insurers had tentatively committed. The
judges' first concern was to make up the difference of $3 million. They
planned to negotiate the "global settlement" as a second and distinct
step in the process, assuming that once the personal injury claims were
resolved, the other disputes would fall into place.1"6 That assumption
eventually proved faulty.
Surprisingly, the state of Connecticut made up the original $3 million
discrepancy. In an incident that Judge Zampano attributed to "superhu-
man" intervention, he received a phone call in September from an aide
to the governor of Connecticut. The aide inquired as to how the media-
tion was proceeding and whether the state could help things along. "You
are standing on the ship of state with life preservers in your hands,"
replied Zampano, "and you are asking a drowning man if you should
throw him one." Eventually the state contributed the $3 million to the
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1.
136. Judge, Lead Counsel Analyze Building Collapse Mediation, supra note 13, at 93-
95.
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settlement fund.13 7 Now the panel had to secure the remaining $21
million.
First, on September 27, 1988, Meadow and Zampano met with the
Group One defendants."3 8 It became immediately apparent that no one
would commit any money to the plaintiffs' settlement fund without a
resolution of all of the remaining claims at the same time. Ironically, by
bringing so many entities into the negotiations, Zampano created a
larger potential settlement fund than initially anticipated, but he had
also expanded the defendants' expectations that their contract claims
would be resolved. 39
The owner/developers, LPLP, were especially adamant on this
point. 1,0 LPLP, in addition to the personal injury claims, faced foreclo-
sure of a $2 million construction mortgage. To meet its potential liabili-
ties, LPLP had to pursue its substantial downstream claims against
TPMI/Macomber on its $12 million performance bond and against
other subcontractors that might share in responsibility for the collapse,
as well as against the city of Bridgeport and CHFA."4' LPLP's attitude
was that it had done nothing wrong, so it faced no real threat from the
plaintiffs. Its strong indemnity claims against TPMI/Macomber, and its
contract indemnification claims against other downstream defendants
such as Texstar, gave it the power to jeopardize the entire settlement.
The other defendants, even if they agreed to the personal injury settle-
ment, would have had to defend virtually identical claims by LPLP.
Many other defendants were unable to commit anything to the plain-
tiffs' claims unless they knew they could recover at least something from
other defendants by way of contract or bond claims. LPLP, for example,
was being asked for its policy limits plus a contribution from the assets
of its principles, which it may have agreed to pay if it could have been
assured of indemnification from TPMI's performance bond. George Ma-
comber, of TPMI/Macomber, had posted a $12 million performance
bond, but he had to personally indemnify the bonding company. To the
extent that he contributed to the plaintiffs fund out of his personal as-
sets, he would have been unable to make good on his indemnity agree-
ment, let alone settle the subcontractors' claims. The same was true of
137. Remarks of Judge Robert C. Zampano, Special Settlement Proceedings (Dec. 1,
1988).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 122-124.
139. Interview with Judge Robert C. Zampano, supra note 108.
140. Besides LPLP, included in this group were TPMI/Macomber, and the principles 6f
LPLP, Lift Frame Builders, Texstar, O'Kon & Co., TPM Architecture/Kent Seyffer, Fair-
field Testing Laboratories, and Preforce Corp.
141. Like the plaintiffs, LPLP had alleged claims against the city and CHFA based on
negligence in approving the building plans and supervising the construction in progress.
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the principles of Texstar and Lift Frame, the other companies with per-
formance bonds. Meanwhile, the OSHA defendants continued to argue
that every dollar paid in fines was a dollar unavailable to pay the plain-
tiffs. While this was not necessarily true as to the proceeds of liability
insurance policies, which could not be used to pay OSHA fines, it was a
persuasive point as to any claim against the defendants' personal assets.
Conversely, legal fees and discovery expenses supposedly saved by set-
tling with the plaintiffs would have to be paid anyway to defend the
OSHA citations. For many defendants, there was simply no incentive to
settle with the plaintiffs without tradeoffs involving the commercial
claims.
The city and CHFA met with the panel after LPLP had left, with
much the same result. Both were fairly confident of defeating the negli-
gence claims brought against them. Yet CHFA was being asked to pay
damages, or to give up its rights as mortgagor, with very little to gain
except the legal fees it might save by an early agreement. These were not
enough to compensate them for the value of the property, even in its
present condition. The mayor of Bridgeport wanted to settle, but he
faced a severe budget crisis. Before recommending to the city council
that some of its scarce tax revenues be paid to the L'Ambiance plaintiffs,
he wanted some reimbursement for its cleanup costs. 4
From the beginning, considerable tension surfaced between the Group
One defendants and Judges Zampano and Meadow. Zampano was genu-
inely surprised that the commercial claims could be such a stumbling
block, and the defendants responded that they had always insisted on
settling all the claims at once. They were willing to contribute to the
plaintiffs' fund, but only on the condition this contribution would "buy
their peace" with the other litigants.
Zampano himself was in a very difficult position. He had promised
many defendants that he would not ignore their commercial claims if
they would agreed to contribute to the plaintiffs' fund. He also knew that
many contractors feared embarrassment if they gave in while others who
"hung tough" were ultimately let out of the settlement. He had promised
that this would not happen, and he would lose considerable credibility if
he could not achieve a global settlement.
Equitably the commercial claims were more difficult than the personal
injury claims to settle. Asking for money for the victims' families is very
142. The state legislature declared that "a financial emergency exists in the town and
city of Bridgeport. ... and established the Bridgeport Financial Review Board to over-
see the city's financial affairs until it can achieve financial stability in the form of balanced
operating funds budgets. 1988 CONN. Sprc. Acts 88-80.
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different than asking for funds to pay a contractor.1 3 No one claimed
the plaintiffs were responsible for what happened, but everyone claimed
that some of the contractors were responsible, and those same contrac-
tors were now demanding compensation. These contradictions were in-
herent in the global settlement. To get the minimum amount of money
for the plaintiffs' fund, Zampano had to stress that multiple parties bore
some of the blame for the tragedy. But, in order to create a commercial
settlement fund, he had to minimize the responsibility of many contrac-
tors who were supposed to be paid for at least part of their claims. All
the mediators' skills had to be turned towards making sure these contra-
dictions did not overwhelm the settlement process.
Over the next two weeks both judges met several times with the Group
One defendants and with other subcontractors. Plaintiffs' counsel were
called to meetings in order to provide still stronger theories of liability or
information that could be used to put more pressure on the defendants to
settle. Various alternatives to a global settlement were proposed, most of
which involved the settlement of some claims while leaving others to be
litigated or mediated later. No one, however, could agree on who would
be left out of the settlement. Each party wanted to settle with the entity
most important to it, either the one it felt it had the best claim against or
the one with the most threatening claim against it. As one attorney said,
they were discussing creating a "limited war" against key defendants,
but everyone wanted someone else to be left in the war.
Sometimes Zampano and Meadow left the parties to talk among
themselves, thus temporarily breaking the earlier pattern of channeling
all communications through the panel. Zampano asked TPMI/Ma-
comber representatives to evaluate all the contract claims and to negoti-
ate for the panel with its numerous subcontractors. As the general con-
tractor, it -was in the best position to decide which claims were valid and
which were exaggerated. TPMI, moreover, was liable for all the bills
presented by the subcontractors, so they were helping themselves by
helping the judge pare down the contract claims. 144
Eventually the outline of a commercial settlement fund was pieced to-
gether, with commitments from the Group One defendants and the sub-
contractors. Four more key entities had to be won over before final set-
tlement of the commercial claims. These were CHFA, the city of
Bridgeport, the Workers' Compensation carriers, and, most importantly,
OSHA. The city of Bridgeport was anxious to settle by October, 1988,
but its severe budget crisis limited the funds it could make available. The
143. Interview with Judge Robert C. Zampano, supra note 108.
144. Interview with Thomas Murtha, supra note 77.
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mayor's goal was to rid Bridgeport of the large hole in the ground that
reminded people of the city's problems. Bridgeport's role in the settle-
ment was highly visible; the local newspaper printed everything it could
on L'Ambiance. The city wanted desperately to be viewed as cooperative
and willing to help the victims, and it did not want to risk being accused
of sabotaging the settlement. On the other hand, with more homeless
people than any other city or town in the state, in addition to a high rate
of unemployment, it had other large claims on its limited resources. The
city had difficulty politically justifying a payment of a million dollars or
more for forty-four families, many of whom were not residents, while it
was having trouble providing basic services to its own citizens.
For Bridgeport, as for CHFA, the breakthrough came when a new
item was injected into the discussions, creating new opportunities for
mutual gains: the rebuilding of L'Ambiance Plaza. Early in !he media-
tion process, some of the parties had suggested that the land, already
subject to the CHFA mortgage and the plaintiffs' attachment, be placed
in trust and developed, with the proceeds set aside for the plaintiffs. Very
gradually this proposal emerged as central to the settlement. It was at-
tractive to the owners because any agreement on the site would involve
forgiveness of the mortgage claims and represent a productive use of the
land. It was also attractive to CHFA, which would refinance the project
and thereby recoup its original mortgage. Had CHFA foreclosed on its
mortgage, it would have been left with a "jinxed site," which no one
would pay market rates to develop. By building and then dedicating part
of the proceeds to the plaintiffs, development seemed much more
likely.14 But most of all, the plan appealed to the mayor and the city of
Bridgeport. By reconstructing the building, the city could convert "a
monument to death" into a "monument to life,"1146 to "turn a negative
into a positive."' 147 By linking the building with the commercial and per-
sonal injury settlements, the mediation panel was finally able to bring
both CHFA and Bridgeport into the settlement.
The rebuilding was the most dramatic example of integrative bargain-
ing in the L'Ambiance settlement. In the final agreement, the owner,
Delwood Development International, Inc., LPLP's general partner, quit-
claimed the land to a trust set up to develop the site and distribute the
145. "[PIlaintiffs' ownership of the site has had a significant and beneficial impact upon
the settlement position of the Connecticut Housing Finance Authority ("CHFA"). CHFA
holds the mortgage on the property and has millions of dollars in contractual claims as a
result of the collapse. The high potential of a public good arising from the rubble has
resulted in major concessions by CHFA to settle its claims." Interim Report, supra note
23, at 15.
146. Interview with Judge Robert C. Zampano, supra note 109.
147. Interview with Edward Hennessey, supra note 104.
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profits, subject to the CHFA mortgage. CHFA received cash of
$5,248,496 against a mortgage of $6,800,000. It agreed, however, to con-
tinue its mortgage to secure another $1,229,708 for the new building. 48
CHFA agreed to contribute $250,000 to the plaintiffs' settlement
fund. 149 Bridgeport, on the other hand, received a $300,000 reimburse-
ment for the rescue and cleanup costs.'50 The city of Bridgeport paid
$1,000,000 to the plaintiffs' settlement fund and agreed to another
$2,000,000 in the form of deferred tax payments on the property.'
Contractors' liens against the property were released as part of the over-
all commercial settlement. 52
Settling with the Workers' Compensation carriers was another stum-
bling block. Each plaintiff was paid Workers' Compensation as a result
of the collapse and most would continue to receive payments for life. 1 3
In'return, the carriers had liens against any settlement based on their
subrogation rights. 54 The settlement also had to be either large enough
to include the carriers' subrogation rights, thus freeing the contractors
from subrogation claims, or to include a waiver of those rights.
Judge Zampano wanted the carriers to pay a lump sum into the settle-
ment fund in exchange for plaintiffs' waivers of any future claim to com-
pensation, not an unusual procedure in cases of workplace injuries. The
seven carriers involved in L'Ambiance began negotiations by presenting
their own formulas for computing the present value of any future peri-
odic payments. The carriers also insisted on reducing their liability well
below what it would have been without the ongoing tort claims because
the money from those claims would contribute to the plaintiffs' support.
The plaintiffs, however, objected to the carriers' formulas as unduly
restrictive and argued for an increase of the carriers' contribution in re-
148. Special Settlement Proceedings, In Re: L'Ambiance Plaza Litigation (Dec. 1,
1988) [hereinafter Special Settlement Proceedings], Claims and Payments to Commercial
Claimants.
149. Special Settlement Proceedings, supra note 148, Contributions to Death and Per-
sohal Injury Settlement Fund 4.
150. Special Settlement Proceedings, supra note 148, Claims and Payments to Commer-
cial Claimants 3.
151. Special Settlement Proceedings, supra note 148, Contributions to Death and Per-
sonal Injury Settlement Fund 2, 5.
152. Remarks of Judge Robert C. Zampano, Special Settlement Proceedings, supra note
148.
153. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-306 (West 1987 & Supp. 1989). Payments end on
remarriage or death of a dependent spouse, and when children reach a certain age. The one
exception was the family of Scott Ward, the youngest victim of the collapse. Ward was
seventeen and working on his spring vacation from high school when he was killed in the
collapse. Because he was employed illegally, the compensation carrier refused to pay his
family compensation. This freed the family from the strictures of the exclusive remedy
rule, but it also meant they had to rely exclusively on the outcome of the tort claims.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
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turn for the waivers.155 The judges had to evaluate the claims carefully
and then negotiate with the carriers as to each individual plaintiff. 56 In
the end, the carriers collectively contributed $3,039,858 to the plaintiffs'
settlement fund in exchange for stipulations from the plaintiffs waiving
all future claims. The carriers also waived $1,163,092.19 in liens against
the plaintiffs' settlement fund. 5' Ultimately, they traded future liability
for lump sum payments, and in doing so they made available more
money for the total plaintiffs' fund, and they freed defendants from the
subrogation claims, which increased the defendants' contributions to
both the plaintiffs' and the commercial settlement funds.
B. The OSHA Fines
On November 15, 1988, the mediation panel issued an Interim Report
and scheduled a final hearing on approval of the global settlement for
December 1, 1988.158 The panel still, however, did not have in place a
resolution of the OSHA fines, and the five defendants cited by OSHA
were unwilling to settle without a major reduction in the $5,000,000 in
outstanding fines. These five were, not surprisingly, among the major
Group One defendants: Lift Frame, Texstar, TPMI/Macomber, Fair-
field Testing Laboratory and Preforce Concrete. Only during the last
week of the negotiations were settlements with OSHA finally
accomplished.
In March 1988 Judge Zampano and Judge Meadow had met in Bos-
ton with OSHA's regional counsel and the Regional Administrator to
explain the mediation process and encourage OSHA to participate. The
judges stressed that OSHA's cooperation was vital for a successful global
settlement. Although OSHA continued to pursue its citations, it had al-
ways been willing to considerably reduce the fines. The fines for fatalities
at that time ranged around $800 to $4,000.151 Large fines of over
$1,000,000 were habitually reduced from 32% to 89%.160 The plaintiffs,
moreover, had been pressuring OSHA by arguing to the press that the
large fines were taking money from the victims' families. As a result,
155. Interview with Jay Sandak, attorney for plaintiffs, in Stanford, Connecticut (July
25, 1989).
156. Interim Report, supra note 23, at 13-14.
157. Id. Special Settlement Proceedings, supra note 148, Contributions to Death and
Personal Injury Settlement Fund.
158. Interim Report, supra note 23, at 18-19.
159. Interview with Michael Felsen, trial attorney, Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor, in Boston, Massachusetts (Apr. 14, 1989).
160. NATIONAL SAFE WORKPLACE INST., FAILED OPPORTUNITIES: THE DECLINE OF U.S.
JOB SAFETY IN THE 1980s 19 (1988).
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Senators Lowell Weiker and Christopher Dodd of Connecticut intro-
duced a bill authorizing the payment of the fines into a trust fund for the
benefit of the plaintiffs. 61 OSHA had strong humanitarian and political
incentives to reduce the fines, because OSHA officials did not want to be
viewed as taking money from the children of the victims. Nor did OSHA
favor the Weiker bill, which would have established the precedent of us-
ing civil fines to pay accident victims.' 62 OSHA hoped only to recoup the
$430,000 it had paid NBS to investigate the collapse.613 This amount
would still represent the largest penalty ever recovered in a construction
context.'
OSHA did insist that its characterization of the offenses be accepted
as "willful misconduct." A plea of no contest to a willful violation had
important consequences. It would result in much higher penalties in case
of any future violations of the same standard by these contractors. 6 5 The
defendants, however, insisted they would never accept the willful charac-
terization of the citations. They wanted the charges reduced to "serious"
violations, 66 because they knew that in future OSHA proceedings or any
civil suit growing out of. L'Ambiance or any other accident, the willful
citations would be used against them.
Throughout the spring and summer, Judge Zampano had continued to
press OSHA to lower the fines and reduce the citations to serious viola-
tions. In all, there were at least six meetings between Zampano and
QSHA officials, including one in Washington D.C. with the OSHA Ad-
ministrator and the Solicitor General's representative. One breakthrough
came in late August when the Justice Department announced that it
would not pursue criminal charges against any-of the contractors.' 67 It
then became somewhat easier for OSHA to lower its fines.' 6 8
By mid-November, 1988, OSHA was the only "missing piece" in the
settlement.'69 After several meetings in New Haven, an agreement was
161. S. 2086, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
162. See Felsen, supra note 66, at 7. "The moral force of that argument [that the
money should go to the victims, not the government] was not lost on the Department of
Labor, despite the Department's reluctance to become a de facto Ofice of Workers'
Compensation."
163. Id.
164. Id. at 9.
165. 29 U.S.C.A. § 666(a) (West 1985).
166. 29 U.S.C.A. § 666(b) (West 1985).
167. Estock, Twardy on L'Ambiance: No Charges, Drop Penalties, The Fairfield Citizen
News, Nov. 25, 1988, at 14, col. 1. Twardy concluded that the government would not be
able to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the violation of an OSHA standard was
the cause of the collapse or that Texstar had been indifferent to or acted in reckless disre-
gard of employee safety.
168. Felsen, supra note 66, at 5.
169. Id. at 10.
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reached to reduce the fines to $430,000. In addition, the defendants
agreed to comply with all OSHA regulations in the future. Regional
counsel and other OSHA personnel traveled to New Haven for what was
to be the final meeting to sign the settlement documents. OSHA's pre-
pared settlement agreement, however, still contained a clause acknowl-
edging the willful violations, and the defendants refused to sign. Judge
Zampano, apparently sympathetic to the defendants' concerns about the
future use of the willful citations, threatened to go to the press and re-
port that OSHA was sabotaging the settlement.17 0
After more discussion, Zampano suggested a compromise that both
sides would accept. In the actual settlement agreements there would be
no reference to willful violations, but the mediation panel was to issue a
press release stating that "the companies have agreed to withdraw their
notices of contest and allow the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission to affirm the willful and serious citations issued by
OSHA."' 7' The defendants would in turn withdraw their notice of con-
test and would agree to their respective fines, which were much lower
than the original assessments. 17  They would certify that all violations
had been abated and would promise future compliance with the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act.'73 The agreement stated that the defend-
ants were not admitting any violation or wrongdoing. Most important for
170. Interview with Kevin Coles, supra note 69.
171. Felsen, supra note 66, at 9.
172. Under the agreement, the fines were reduced to the following amounts: Texstar
Inc., $300,000; Lift Frame, $26,900; TPMI/Macomber, $100,000; Fairfield Testing Labo-
ratory, Inc., $3,000; and Preforce Corporation, $100. Texstar and its subsidiary, Continen-
tal Lift Slab Corporation, also settled seven other OSHA complaints that had been filed
against it after L'Ambiance. It paid no penalty for these citations and withdrew its notice
of contest. Secretary of Labor v. Texstar Constr. Corp., No. 87-1956, Region I, Settlement
Agreement (United States Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, Nov. 18,
1988); Secretary of Labor v. TPMI/Macomber, A Joint Venture, No. 87-1955, Region 1,
Settlement Agreement (United States Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n
Nov. 18, 1988); Secretary of Labor v. Lift-Frame Builders, Inc., No. 87-1738, Region I,
Settlement Agreement (United States Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n
Nov. 21, 1988); Secretary of Labor v. Fairfield Testing Lab Inc., No. 87-1957, Region I,
Settlement Agreement (United States Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n
Nov. 18, 1988); Secretary of Labor v. Preforce Corp., No. 87-1893, Region I, Settlement
Agreement (United States Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n Nov. 18,
1988).
In order to induce these defendants to contribute more to the settlement, all fines were
paid by the Reserve Fund. See infra note 186. In return, TPMI/Macomber paid an addi-
tional $104,000 to the plaintiffs' settlement fund; Fairfield Testing paid an additional
$3,000 and Preforce an additional $1,000. Texstar waived its $325,000 commercial claim,
and Lift Frame waived its $175,000 commercial claim. In this way the settlement fund
netted an extra $178,000. Special Settlement Proceedings, supra note 149, Motion of the
L'Ambiance Mediation Panel Re: OSHA Fines 2, Special Settlement Proceedings, supra
note 149, Contributions to Payment of OSHA Settlement Fines.
173. Id.
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the defendants, OSHA stipulated that "[n]either this Settlement Agree-
ment nor any of its terms shall be introduced into evidence as to any
issue of law or fact or used for any other purpose, in any proceeding,
suit, or action, including proceedings and matters arising under the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act."" 4
Counsel for OSHA believed that the agreement satisfied all of the
Agency's priorities. The fines were still among the largest in its history
and would meet all its expenses. In addition, it avoided a confrontation
over the Weiker bill and obtained the defendants' -commitment to future
compliance with OSHA regulations. As to the willful issue, OSHA per-
sonnel believed that they had not given up very much. OSHA can use
the existence of the citations, along with the facts available about the
L'Ambiance Plaza collapse, in any future proceeding based on a similar
violation.17 5
Attorney fees to plaintiffs' counsel was the last item to be negotiated.
Under the Connecticut Tort Reform Act, fees in personal injury actions
could range from a high of one-third of the recovery to a low of ten
percent, depending on the amount of the settlement." 6 The Plaintiffs'
Steering Committee knew early on that it would have to commit to a
reduction in fees, and all members readily agreed to do so. 7' Ultimately,
counsel agreed to the panel's proposal to reduce their fees to approxi-
mately half of what they would have received under the Tort Reform
Act. 78
C. The Final Hearing
By December 1, 1988, the panel had held 400 mediation sessions. Ac-
cording to Judge Zampano, there were problems until the night before
174. Id.
175. Interview with Michael Felsen, supra note 159.
176. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-25 1c (West Supp. 1989). The statute allows a contin-
gent fee of 33 % of the first $300,000; 25% of the next $300,000; 20% of the next
$300,000,; 15% of the next $300,000; and 10% of amounts over $1,200,000.
177. Interview with Richard Bieder, supra note 94. "Plaintiffs are used to reducing their
fees to make a settlement work."
178. The formula was: 25% of the first $300,000; 20% of the next $300,000; and 15%
of the next $300,000. Fees for Workers' Compensation settlements were 10% of amounts
paid in lieu of future payments. Fees came to approximately 17.7% of the total initial
payout. No fees were awarded on the waiver of Workers' Compensation liens. No fees were
paid on payments held in escrow to settle unknown future claims, though fees would be
paid on any amounts left in this fund at the end of a certain time period. No fees were paid
on any other parts of the settlement, including the building site and income derived from
any rebuilt structure, or on the $2 million in tax abatements from the city. Special Settle-
ment Proceedings, supra note 149, Motion for Approval of Settlement Procedures, Awards,
Contributions and Payments in the Death and Personal Injury Cases 2-4.
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the final hearing. Most settlement documents, including large numbers
of releases and stipulations, still had to be signed, and some releases
were even being drafted the morning of the final hearing during an 11:00
a.m. recess.
Nevertheless, the final hearing took place as scheduled on December
1, 1988. Judge Zampano has a finely tuned sense of a court's role in
American culture: part theatre, part high church, and part ultimate ex-
pression of civil authority. The final hearing was carefully designed to fill
all these roles in order to legitimize the mediation and to create a sense
of closure for all involved. Zampano is also a master at translating legal
complexities into terms lay people understand. At the final hearing, he
gave the L'Ambiance parties what every litigant wants, a short (three
hours) and comprehensible day in court.
Every jurisdiction involved in the case was represented at the hearing:
the Connecticut State Superior Court, the United States District Court
for the District of Connecticut, the Connecticut Probate Court, the Con-
necticut Workers' Compensation Commission, and the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration. Judges from each court, along with
the Connecticut Commissioner of Labor, presided simultaneously from
the bench. All the plaintiffs and their families, along with their counsel,
were invited. The courtroom was filled and the proceedings were ampli-
fied for those left standing in the hallways.
Judges Meadow and Zampano began by explaining the details of the
mediation process. Zampano stressed how much time and money and
frustration had been avoided by mediating rather than litigating. He
never, however, minimized the difficulties of the mediation itself. "At
first it felt like we were climbing Mt. Everest in our bathing suits," he
said at one point. He thanked all those involved and reiterated his sym-
pathy for the plaintiffs. He invoked religious imagery several times, as
did other speakers, and then explained the outlines of the final settle-
ment. Papers with the details of the settlement were entered into the
record. Then attorneys for the plaintiffs and the defendants spoke, ex-
pressing their thanks to the panel and their enthusiasm for the settle-
ment. Although the parties were given the chance to object to any aspect
of the settlement, no one did. Finally, each tribunal separately approved
the agreement as "fair, just and reasonable." There followed statements
by several of the judges praising the efforts of Judge Zampano and
Judge Meadow, and congratulating all the participants. The mood was
one of awe and celebration. Above all, defendants and plaintiffs were
made to feel good about being part of such an historic proceeding.
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IX. THE SETTLEMENT
The final settlement, including the commercial claims, totalled $41
million, plus the equity in the L'Ambiance Plaza building site. The
plaintiffs' fund had grown to $34,809,528, though some of this was in the
form of structured settlements so that the present value of the fund was
lower. Forty-two entities contributed to the fund, including the state of
Connecticut."' The commercial settlement was funded largely by the
three insurance companies issuing the builders' risk policy and the per-
formance and payment bonds. George Macomber paid $1,000,000 to the
plaintiffs' fund and $500,000 to the commercial fund from his personal
assets. The OSHA fines were paid in part from the commercial fund and
in part by the individual contractors. George B.H. Macomber Co., Fair-
field Testing Laboratory Inc. and Preforce paid $108,000.01. Texstar as-
signed its commercial claim for $325,000 and Lift Frame assigned its
commercial claim for $175,000 to the commercial fund.1 80 Together,
$7,798,496 was paid into the commercial settlement fund.1 81
The plaintiffs' awards were carefully tailored to meet the survivors'
needs. In general, estates of deceased victims with no dependents re-
ceived a lump sum of approximately $500,000. Estates of younger, single
men received more, depending on whether they supported parents or
others at the time of the disaster. Parents and spouses received lump sum
payments plus annuities for a fixed number of years or for life. The larg-
est amounts went to young families of the deceased victims. Some of
these received awards -with a present value of up to $1.2 million with
guaranteed payouts ranging up to $3.2 million including attorney fees.
Payments to injured survivors ranged from a net of $18,750 for emo-
tional distress to $1,418,564.182
Forty-five commercial entities were paid parts of their commercial
claims. In all, out of $16,206,328.86 initially claimed, the parties re-
ceived $9,243,846.71.113 The panel also provided for future unknown ex-
179. Special Settlement Proceedings, supra note 149, Contributions to Death and Per-
sonal Injury Settlement Fund. The seven Workers' Compensation carriers were listed as a
single contributor.
180. Special Settlement Proceedings, supra note 149, Contributions to Payment of
OSHA Settlement Fines.
181. Special Settlement Proceedings, supra note 149, Contributions to Commercial Set-
tlement Fund.
182. Special Settlement Proceedings, supra note 149, Death and Personal Injury Cases,
Distribution to Claimants from the $30 M Settlement Fund. Future payments were to be
distributed from development of the building site on a pro rata basis according to the
shares indicated in this document.
183. Special Settlement Proceedings, supra note 149, Claims and Payments to Commer-
cial Claimants. Commercial claims by subcontractors totaled $3,506,328.86 and were set-
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penses. An additional "Claimant-Beneficiary's Retained Fund" of $3.6
million was set aside to meet administrative expenses and to deal with
new or otherwise unpaid claims. Out of this sum, the panel set up an
escrow fund of $1 million to satisfy the plaintiffs "save harmless" agree-
ments with the defendants (in case of new commercial claims), to reim-
burse plaintiffs' counsel for out-of-pocket expenses, and in general to re-
solve any unforeseen problems.""' A Reserve Fund of $2,429,708 was
established for resolution of the CHFA mortgage on the property and to
pay any "short fall" in the commercial claims and the OSHA fines.185 A
Special Master was appointed to administer the settlement and oversee
development of the building site. The Special Master's and the Trustee's
expenses were also to be paid from the Reserve Fund. 8 6
Unfortunately, but perhaps inevitably, a few new would-be plaintiffs
appeared after the hearing to demand compensation. Six personal injury
and one contract claim were filed against the fund after December 1,
1988. After hearings before the mediation panel, four of the six personal
injury claimants were awarded $10,000 and two were awarded $25,000.
The commercial claim was settled for $606. All of these were paid out of
interest earned on the "Claimant-Beneficiary's Retained Fund."18
A. Why it Worked
In the aftermath of the settlement, the mediators, especially Judge
Zampano, received a tremendous amount of praise for their accomplish-
ment. Both judges were given an award by the Center for Public Re-
sources and the New Jersey Center for Dispute Resolution held a full
day panel on the case. Judge Zampano was later nominated for the
Devitt Distinguished Service to Justice Award, one of the highest honors
tied for $1,095,350.71. Claims against the Builder's Risk Policy and Performance Bonds
totaled $12,700,000 and were settled for $8,148,496 in cash and a $1,229,708 mortgage to
CHFA.
184. Interim Report, supra note 23, at 16. CHFA had been paid cash of $4,048,496
from the settlement fund, but it still held an outstanding mortgage lien of $2,429,708. That
lien was resolved with a cash payment of $1,200,000 from the Reserve Fund, and a contin-
uation of the mortgage of $1,229,708. Special Settlement Proceedings, supra note 150,
Motion for Approval of Settlement Procedures, Awards, and Payments in the Commercial
Cases. CHFA also paid $250,000 into the plaintiffs' settlement fund. Special Settlement
Proceedings, supra note 150, Contributions to Death and Personal Injury Settlement Fund.
185. Special Settlement Proceedings, supra note 149, Motion for Approval of Settle-
ment Procedures, Awards, and Payments in the Commercial Cases 4.
186. Special Settlement Proceedings, supra note 149, L'Ambiance Plaza Escrow
Agreement.
187. Motion Re: Approval of Post Settlement Payments, In Re: L'Ambiance Plaza Liti-
gation, Post Settlement Claimants (June 14, 1989); Id., Order Re: Post-Settlement Pay-
ments (June 14, 1989).
[Vol. 5:2 1990]
THE L'AMBIANCE PLAZA MEDIATION
bestowed upon federal judges. 18  The process was praised as a triumph of
powerful, charismatic, and dedicated leadership over the complexities of
modern commercial and legal reality.'89
The foregoing analysis of the settlement process, however, reveals that
the factors present in this case which typically encourage settlement
were exploited with considerable skill by the mediators so that settlement
became more attractive to the parties than its alternatives. Judge
Zampano was able to keep the parties' estimates of the costs of contin-
ued litigation high and the potential gains low, or at least uncertain, so
that in an analysis of the options, settlement made sense. In addition, by
bringing in numerous parties and working out creative solutions, he was
able to shift the dispute from a problem in zero-sum, distributive bar-
gaining to one of integrative bargaining in which the efficient frontier of
settlement was expanded.
B. Manipulating Perceptions
L'Ambiance Plaza teaches that judicial mediators can encourage set-
tlement by changing one or more variables in the linear settlement
model. 190 Recall that the model previously described posits that when the
plaintiff, considering the odds of winning a fixed amount and the poten-
tial costs of litigating, arrives at a reservation price less than what the
defendant is willing to pay based on similar calculations, the dispute
should settle. 9 Perceptions of the probabilities of success and of poten-
tial costs are the key variables that determine when settlement is likely
to occur. To facilitate settlement, mediators must change those percep-
tions. They can try to alter the parties' estimates of success on the merits
of the claims, or they can alter the potential transaction costs and the
potential gains. Judges have considerable resources with which to do
both. For example, a judge's control over the disposition of certain legal
issues can be used to alter the estimates of probable success. By ruling
on preliminary motions, or by indicating how he or others might rule, the
judge can revise the parties' probability variables and so alter the reser-
vation prices.' On the other hand, judges or other mediators can try to
188. See supra note 13.
189. See, e.g., Successful Mediation in Conn. Apt. Collapse Showcases Aptness of
ADR in Larger Cases, 7 ALTERNATIVES 41, 49 (Mar. 1989): ("What explains the judges'
ability to secure such agreements, not only from plaintiff lawyers and the federal govern-
ment, but also from many other parties? Judicial prestige, perhaps, or persistence, or pow-
ers of persuasion. But whatever it is, it is a distinctly personal ability.")
190. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
191. See supra note 41.
192. Schuck, supra note 1, at 351-52. See also text accompanying notes 51-53.
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alter the parties' estimates of the costs of litigation and the amount at
stake, with the same result.
Although Judges Zampano and Meadow never ruled officially on any
legal issues in the L'Ambiance Plaza case, they made numerous critical
decisions on the facts as to liability and damages. They divided the de-
fendants into three categories based on the extent to which each was
responsible for the collapse, in spite of the lack of any meaningful discov-
ery, thereby unofficially deciding on the liability of each defendant. The
panel virtually imposed mandatory settlement figures on the plaintiffs
when they presented the nonnegotiable minimum settlement offers. The
judges also negotiated the amounts of each commercial settlement.
To the extent that the panel discussed specific legal issues, they chose
to stress the unresolved and uncertain nature of the law. Zampano re-
fused several times to discuss legal defenses or theories of liability."9 3 He
constantly stressed to the defendants, however, how sympathetic a jury
was likely to be with these plaintiffs. He often referred to the widows in
black robes, to remind each defendant that, at the trial level, the case
would turn on the human factors and not on technicalities such as the
principle employer rule or the effect of tort reform. He held out the spec-
ter of trial judges unwilling to grant summary judgment in such an emo-
tionally charged case. To win on legal grounds, appeals would be neces-
sary. All this served to raise defendants' estimates both of the plaintiffs'
chances of prevailing, and of the defendants' total liability if that
occurred.
The cost variables were also stressed throughout the mediation. Judge
Zampano reiterated how much discovery would be required, how expen-
sive the inevitable appeals would be, and how long it would take (up to
ten years) before any plaintiff would actually be paid anything. The
plaintiffs were reminded of the low amounts of insurance available, the
probable insolvency of many defendants, and the emotional toll of drag-
ging the case through discovery and trial. The early commencement of
the mediation made this tactic especially effective. By staying further
litigation and eliminating virtually all discovery, the panel kept future
costs very high in comparison with the costs of settlement. At the same
time, the number of defendants was increased to keep the costs high.
With each new defendant, potential costs rose as issues and paperwork
multiplied.
When asked why they agreed to the L'Ambiance settlement, most of
the attorneys involved answered in terms that validate the use of a linear
193. Interview with Judge Robert C. Zampano, supra note 108. See also text accompa-
nying notes 107-108.
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settlement equation to explain the case. Economics drove the settle-
ment.294 For each party, the expected gains, the low or uncertain
probability of success, and the estimated costs of continued litigation
made settlement impossible to refuse.
C. Expanding Opportunities for Trades
Even more important for the settlement than the manipulation of the
parties' perceptions was the way in which the two judges created new
opportunities for mutual gain and expanded the efficient frontier of the
dispute so that the parties could reach an integrated, nonzero-sum settle-
ment. The panel accomplished this by bringing many defendants into the
mediation process, by identifying the diverse interests of all the parties
and expanding the items on the table for discussion, and linking together
different items or creating tradeoffs that resulted in mutual gain. This
created an efficient frontier of possible settlements based on a series of
linkages of items with differing priorities, or values, for each of the par-
ties.195 Essentially, the plaintiffs valued high settlements paid quickly
and were indifferent as to whether the defendants settled the OSHA or
commercial claims. The defendants, on the other hand, placed a high
value on the OSHA and commercial settlements and were willing to
place a low value on prompt payment. The defendants, because they
were resigned to paying the limits of their insurance policies, also put
little value on varying the amounts of the individual settlements, except
as they affected assets available to pay commercial claims. The defend-
ants, therefore, were willing to accept a variety of plaintiffs' packages
that were also acceptable to the plaintiffs, if they could resolve their
commercial claims: a perfect opportunity for an integrated settlement.
There was, in other words, an efficient frontier of acceptable settlements
of all the issues such that an improvement for one party did not mean a
disadvantage for the others.
Focusing on a global settlement, Zampano included the commercial
claims and the OSHA fines among the bargaining items. The defendants
valued these claims differently, so by linking the settlement of the per-
sonal injury and commercial claims, Zampano was able to induce many
parties to settle. Recall that Zampano had deliberately cast a wide net
194. Interviews with all defense attorneys and plaintiffs' attorneys confirmed this view.
Only the city's counsel, Edward Hennessey, mentioned the linkage to the reconstruction of
the site and the city's political need to get L'Ambiance out of the public consciousness as a
reason to settle.
195. For a discussion of the way such prioritizing can aid in negotiating settlements, see
H. RAIFFA, supra note 10, at 131-65; 251-55; 288-317.
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for commercial claimants. From the beginning, he asked every defendant
who they had claims against and what evidence they had to support
those claims. While in early October it appeared that these expectations
might jeopardize the whole personal injury settlement, in the end the
opposite was true. By linking settlement of the commercial claims with
the personal injury claims, Zampano was able to make settlement of the
latter much more attractive to many of the key defendants.
By far the two biggest tradeoffs made by the parties involved the re-
construction of the building and the OSHA fines. For the city in particu-
lar, the reconstruction served its interest in creating a positive public im-
age. The value of the building, psychologically and in future revenues,
outweighed the City of Bridgeport's financial contribution to the settle-
ment. For CHFA, the building was a symbol as well as an opportunity to
recoup some of its investment as interest on the continuing mortgage.
For the plaintiffs, too, the building had symbolic value. Many of them
were reluctant to agree to any settlement that would allow the owners to
continue with business as usual.' The reconstruction not only held the
promise of future income for the plaintiffs, it also made certain that
LPLP and TPMI/Macomber would be deprived of any chance to recap-
ture their L'Ambiance losses through profits on a new L'Ambiance
Plaza.
The importance of the OSHA fines to the OSHA defendants was obvi-
ous. Their interest in avoiding $5 million in fines and in suffering an
administrative finding of fault was very strong. The resolution of the
OSHA citations cleared the way for the contribution of several million
dollars to the settlement fund.
The settlement of all Workers' Compensation claims was important to
the plaintiffs. To settle the personal injury claims without certainty as to
how much would be claimed by the carriers exerting their subrogation
claims, and with no clarity as to the status of future benefits would have
been unacceptable. To resolve these issues, Zampano had to link the per-
sonal injury settlements with waivers of the subrogation liens and a lump
sum contribution to each plaintiff in lieu of future compensation.
Finally, at its most basic level, the settlement involved the typical
trade of time for money that is characteristic of most personal injury
negotiations. The defendants' desire to put L'Ambiance behind them,
and the plaintiffs' desire for some money damages before the defendants
became judgment-proof created a perfect opportunity for a nonzero-sum
solution.
196. Interview with Jay Sandak, supra note 155.
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X. IMPLICATIONS FOR JUDICIAL MEDIATION
The unique powers of judicial mediators were responsible to a great
extent for the panel's success in creating an integrated settlement. It is
important to examine this aspect of the process so as to appreciate its
implications for future judicial mediation. First, Judges Zampano and
Meadow used their status and influence to bring into the mediation pro-
cess large numbers of potential defendants to create the global settle-
ment. They also stopped the participants from filing more suits or pursu-
ing discovery. While both judges had the ability to obtain stays of
proceedings pending in their respective jurisdictions, they had no real
power to stop the parties from filing discovery requests or from bringing
more lawsuits. Yet, except for the OSHA proceeding, which was eventu-
ally stayed as well, all litigation stopped with the commencement of the
mediation.
Moreover, Judge Zampano had access to other government entities
rarely available to private mediators. Just as he brought the defendants
to the bargaining table, he brought OSHA, an independent federal
agency, into the process with a single phone call. He met with high rank-
ing OSHA officials in Washington, and his urgent requests for a compro-
mise probably reached the Secretary of Labor. He also obtained a
$3,000,000 contribution from the state of Connecticut, hardly a typical
occurrence in mass tort litigation.
Zampano also exerted considerable pressure over outsiders. The na-
tional and local press respected his insistence on secrecy. No reporters
ever approached the plaintiffs to discuss the mediation and there were
virtually no serious press leaks. 197 At the same time, Zampano made ex-
tensive contact with experts on various aspects of the case and obtained a
lot of information that helped him and Judge Meadow in negotiations.
He spent five hours with an expert on builders' risk policies and perform-
ance and payment bonds. He met with leading Workers' Compensation
attorneys and local claims managers. He contacted other judges who had
presided over other mass tort settlements.
Finally, both judges made full use of their status to exert considerable
moral pressure on the parties to settle. While some of this moral suasion
can be attributed to Judge Zampano's personality, his deep personal
197. This can be partially explained by Judge Zampano's efforts to keep the press in-
formed when he felt able to release information. By giving interviews and releasing news at
key stages in the proceedings, he maintained control of the flow of information and satisfied
the press so that they respected his requests for discretion.
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commitment to the case,198 and the respect he commanded from the le-
gal community, any judge has, by virtue of the office, considerable per-
suasive powers. A judge can exert pressure that would not be tolerated in
a private mediator. In fact, shortly after the L'Ambiance collapse, a pri-
vate mediation service in Hartford, Connecticut known as Dispute Reso-
lution, Inc. began initial meetings with insurance carriers to try to settle
the case. The effort was slow and cumbersome, and ultimately ended
when Judge Zampano was appointed mediator. Even in those few
months the difficulties for private mediators surfaced after there was a
dangerous leak to the press. As a result, many parties were reluctant to
reveal their strategies or to participate, so that by January 1988 only a
few defendants were involved. In addition, the private firm ultimately
lacked the resources for such a large-scale mediation effort. 99
The judges enhanced their already considerable powers of office by
deliberately isolating the parties and maintaining the panel as the central
point around which all negotiations took place. By insisting on meeting
individually or in small groups with the parties, they prevented alliances
from forming among the defendants."' The panel also maintained enor-
mous control. Judge Zampano and Judge Meadow had extensive knowl-
edge about the case. They knew more about L'Ambiance Plaza than an-
yone else, even after the settlement was made public. Knowledge is
power in negotiations, and both judges made certain they would wield
that power.
Special factors in the L'Ambiance Plaza mediation also contributed to
its success, but these factors are not necessarily beyond replication.
Judge Zampano commanded enormous respect from all the attorneys in-
volved, even before the mediation began. Most attorneys, moreover, were
part of a close knit legal community. All of them knew and for the most
part trusted one another, and they knew they would have to work to-
gether again in the future. Judge Zampano also encouraged trust and
confidence among the parties, and built that trust by his continuous in-
sistence on personal contact with the actual clients.
Other special aspects of the case had to do with the parties. The plain-
tiffs, Zampano himself noted, were never greedy. Although they were
angry and grieving all through the process, they never insisted on total
198. Interview with Judge Robert C. Zampano, supra note 108. Zampano's personal
commitment to obtaining adequate and speedy relief for the plaintiffs intensified considera-
bly after the individual meetings.
199. Interview with Donald Reder, President, Dispute Resolution, Inc., in Hartford,
Connecticut (Mar. 10, 1989).
200. See H. RAIFFA, supra note 10, at 251-74 for a discussion of shifting alliances in
multiparty negotiations. Zampano's deliberate insistence on dealing singly with the parties
minimized the chances that such alliances might threaten the settlement.
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victory over the defendants or sought unreasonable sums. The defendants
were small or mid-sized businesses. Often the business owner was per-
sonally related to the victim. The defendants considered many of the vic-
tims to be close friends; people who had worked alongside them and
whom they had brought into the construction business. These owners
wanted to help the victims by making a contribution so as to make up for
the tragedy in which they all were involved. Most of all, the defendants
were practical businessmen anxious to get on with their lives and their
businesses. The need to close their files and put the case behind them
was arguably greater for small businesses than for large corporations.
With the foregoing analysis, it is possible to summarize those aspects
of the L'Ambiance mediation panel's behavior that can be applied to
future mass tort settlements.
1. Various factors kept the parties' RPs in a relationship that made
settlement attractive. These factors included early intervention and stay
of all proceedings so that past investment in the case was low, but antici-
pated future expenditures were very high.
2. The early identification of the parties' primary interests and the
expansion of items in the dispute to create linkages and tradeoffs.
3. The use of judicial power to bring into the process all parties neces-
sary to resolve the enlarged dispute.
4. The creative use of remedies that would be unavailable in an adver-
sary proceeding, such as the reconstruction of the building, the press
conference as part of the OSHA settlement, the $2 million tax abate-
ment from the city and the CHFA mortgage continuation, and the reso-
lution of the Workers' Compensation claims.
5. Extensive direct personal contact with the parties to establish trust
in the mediation and the mediators, and to create a substitute for due
process hearings in which each party has an opportunity to be heard by a
neutral decision maker.
6. The isolation of the parties from one another in order to maintain
control over the process and prevent destructive coalitions from forming.
7. The meticulous preparation and thorough knowledge of every aspect
of the case.
8. The insistence on maintaining the integrity of the process by main-
taining the confidentiality of the meetings and creating an atmosphere of
trust.
While the degree to which each of these techniques was successful can
be attributed in part to Judge Zampano's personal skill and dedication,
the basic techniques can be applied in other settings and probably are, in
different ways, standard features of judicial mediation. Early interven-
tion is becoming more frequent in mass torts, and several have settled
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
recently with unusual speed.2°0 Judges have manipulated the parties' es-
timates of the strength of their case for as long as they have held settle-
ment conferences. Judges frequently see their role in settlement as pro-
viding a supposedly neutral opinion on the validity of each side's claims
in order to move both closer to settlement.20' Other forms of manipula-
tion, such as ruling on pretrial motions, or the use of experts or mock
jury trials, are variations on this theme. Identification of the parties' real
interests and meeting those interests is precisely what mediators are sup-
posed to do. 20 3 Individual meetings with parties and participation by non-
parties are less common, but can readily be initiated in other appropriate
contexts.
20 4
XI. EVALUATION OF THE MEDIATION PROCESS
In spite of the enthusiasm with which the L'Ambiance settlement was
greeted, questions remain about whether the mediation process com-
ported with the basic values of the judicial system. Before others can
embrace the L'Ambiance mediation as a model, there should be some
attention paid to whether all, or parts, of that model ought to be
encouraged.
Dispute resolution processes are generally measured by three criteria.
One is efficiency; is it less costly and less time-consuming than its alter-
natives. Second is it fair and just for all parties, and third, is it consonant
with the goals of the judicial system as a whole. Some aspects of the
L'Ambiance mediation process did not meet these three criteria. Given
the available alternatives, however, the advantages of the process out-
weigh the disadvantages.
There is little question that the process saved a great deal of time and
money for the parties. The reason most frequently given by the parties
for settling was that economically there was no other choice. To a great
extent, however, costs were not avoided by the parties, but were merely
shifted from the parties to the court.'0 5 Two judges and their staffs spent
most of eleven months on the case. Judge Zampano continues to work
every day with the Special Master on issues of administration. Of course,
201. See supra notes 3 and 4.
202. Brazil, supra note 6; Lynch & Levine, supra note 5.
203. L. SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, supra note 27, at 162-65.
204. Brazil, supra note 6, at 16-19.
205. L'Ambiance was less costly than other mass tort settlements. For the Agent Or-
ange case, Judge Weinstein in the Eastern District of New York appointed three special
masters and set up a special document headquarters with its own clerk. P. SCHUCK, supra
note II, at 112.
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it is not possible to measure accurately how these costs compare with the
costs of a lengthy trial for either the parties or the judiciary. On balance,
it is likely that regardless of the high cost to the state and federal sys-
tems, those costs would have been much higher had the case gone to trial
and appeals. The mediation, then, did meet the first criteria of efficiency.
Nevertheless, if public resources are to be devoted to mass tort settle-
ments, some effort should be made to measure the public costs involved.
The second criteria of fairness and justice is more problematic. Most
of the participants believed that justice was done and that the settlement
was a reasonable way to deal with a terrible tragedy. 0 6 They also be-
lieved that the mediation process itself was fair. There are dissenters,
however. Some defendants feel that they were forced to pay damages
with no legal liability. The company that supplied a screw used in one of
the shearheads, paid$150,000 into the settlement. A crane operator who
had left the site three days before the collapse and returned to partici-
pate in the rescue paid $250,000. Judge Zampano stated openly and
often that the Group Three defendants were simply asked to pay their
estimated costs of defense; none of them appeared to have any legal lia-
bility. Such results raise serious due process questions. Such questions
multiply when one recalls that the defendants were never sued by any
plaintiff, but were instead forced into a settlement proceeding at the re-
quest of a federal judge.207
Finally, there is the third criteria of whether the mediation served the
goals of the justice system. These goals include compensation for harm
and an efficient allocation of the costs of that harm. The L'Ambiance
mediation met these goals. To a greater degree than would have been
possible through litigation, each party received at least some compensa-
tion, and the costs were shared by all the entities involved. Space does
not permit an inquiry into the efficiencies of various forms of tort com-
pensation.208 It seems, however, that this mediation served at least as
well as most trials to allocate costs and compensation in a tolerable
manner.
Two other systemic, goals were less adequately served. The first con-
cerns fairness and justice, and is closely linked to the issue of individual
justice. One goal of the tort system is to institutionalize some societal
judgment either by condoning or condemning the parties' behavior. In
this way, society establishes its expectations for private and public be-
havior and penalizes those whose behavior falls below those expectations.
206. Judge Zampano received numerous letters from plaintiffs thanking him for his
efforts.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
208. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 43, at 147-99; Epstein, supra note 1.
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A related goal of the system is to make law that sets standards for future
behavior and establishes precedent for future cases. The L'Ambiance
mediation contributed very little toward these goals. Because responsibil-
ity was dispersed over so many entities, actual responsibility was never
allocated with certainty. As a result, no single entity was found to be at
fault, thus making future deterrence minimal.
On the other hand, lift slab construction has largely been eliminated
as a viable construction method, and many companies found that the
protection of Workers' Compensation was ephemeral. Because the
L'Ambiance settlement cost some defendants a great deal of money, it
may have provided some incentive for greater workplace safety, espe-
cially in construction.
There were, however, many lost opportunities for judicial lawmaking
that would have had a great impact on future tort cases. The exclusive
remedy rule remains unchanged, and as long as mass torts are settled, no
court will have to reconsider that rule in the context of large-scale dam-
ages. There was also no definitive interpretation of the Tort Reform Act.
Conversely, the litigation did raise public awareness of many legal issues
that are now the subject of legislation and administrative regulation. The
principal employer rule has been modified to provide greater protection
for construction workers." 9 A temporary moratorium was placed on lift
slab construction in Connecticut.2 10 In addition, OSHA has proposed
changes in its regulations for lift slab construction, 2 1 and there is a bill
pending in Congress to strengthen OSHA's enforcement powers in the
construction industry.21 2
Many of the L'Ambiance defendants wanted exoneration. They
wanted to be absolved from blame for what happened. Most of them
suffered from survivors' guilt, even though they believed they had not
caused the collapse. Yet, because they all contributed to the settlement
fund, no defendant was fully exonerated, as they may have been by a
jury or a court. On the contrary, the whole thrust of Judge Zampano's
efforts was to make every defendant feel responsible so that each would
agree to settle.
Did the L'Ambiance settlement serve justice? The answer is mixed.
The process served many goals of the judicial system well. It served
others less well. Before any final evaluation can be made, it is necessary
209. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-291 (West Supp. 1989).
210. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-276a (West Supp. 1989). The moratorium is to last
until the state building inspector and the codes and standards committee adopt regulations
with "stringent safety requirements" for the use of lift slab construction methods.
211. Concrete and Masonry Construction Safety Standards; Lift-Slab Construction, 53
Fed. Reg. 35,972 (1988).
212. S.-2518, 100th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1988).
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to consider the alternatives. How else could- L'Ambiance Plaza have been
dealt with? A trial would have taken years and would inevitably have
been followed by appeals and perhaps retrials. At some point there
would have been a settlement, though probably at much greater expense
to the participants. Fewer defendants would have been involved, but per-
haps fewer would have received any payment of their commercial claims.
The impact on their businesses would have been worse, and some might
have ceased to exist.
Perhaps the most significant lesson of the L'Ambiance mediation is
that mass tort litigation may have become too complex for the legal sys-
tem to deal with in traditional ways. New techniques need to be devel-
oped in order to serve the mediation participants without sacrificing the
goals of the justice system. The L'Ambiance Plaza mediation was a ma-
jor step in this direction. Judge Zampano developed and fine-tuned sev-
eral mediation. techniques that can enable the system to resolve such
cases more efficiently. These techniques will be copied and developed fur-
ther. We have not seen the last building collapse or plane crash. In the
meantime, some of our traditional notions of fairness and due process
may be altered. Fault will certainly play a lesser role than it has in
resolving mass tort disputes. Legislatures will take over some of the judi-
cial function of allocating the cost of accidents. Perhaps some attention
will be paid to lowering the high costs of litigation that made settlement
an unavoidable alternative for so many parties in L'Ambiance Plaza.
L'Ambiance also demonstrates how disputes are coming to be seen as
economic and managerial problems, to be dealt with through principles
and techniques learned from disciplines other than law. In essence, mass
torts are forcing the system to incorporate nonzero-sum outcomes into a
zero-sum environment. Through judicial mediation, integrative bargain-
ing and creative solutions can be imposed within an adversarial frame-
work. The question the case raises for the future is the degree to which
the advantages of such solutions outweigh the losses to some of our tradi-
tional due process values.

